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RECONCILING TAX LAW AND SECURITIES REGULATION
Omri Marian*
Issuers in registered securities offerings must disclose the expected tax consequences
to investors investing in the offered securities (“nonfinancial tax disclosure”). This
Article advances three arguments regarding nonfinancial tax disclosures. First,
nonfinancial tax disclosure practice, as the Securities and Exchange Commission
(the SEC) has sanctioned it, does not fulfill its intended regulatory purposes. Cur-
rently, nonfinancial tax disclosures provide irrelevant information, sometimes fail
to provide material information, create unnecessary transaction costs, and divert
valuable administrative resources to the enforcement of largely-meaningless require-
ments. Second, the practical reason for this failure is the SEC and tax practitioners’
unsuccessful attempt to address investors’ heterogeneous tax preferences. Specifi-
cally, nonfinancial tax disclosure practice assumes the existence of a “reasonable
investor” who is also an “average taxpayer,” and tax disclosures are drafted for the
benefit of this average taxpayer. The concept of an “average taxpayer,” however, is
not defensible. Third, the theoretical reason for the regulatory regime’s dysfunction-
ality is the misapplication of mandatory disclosure theory to nonfinancial tax
disclosure requirements. Mandatory disclosure theory, even if accepted at face
value, does not support the current regulatory framework, due to the special nature
of tax laws. To remedy this failure, this Article describes the types of tax-related
disclosures that mandatory disclosure theory would support. Under the proposed
regulatory reform, nonfinancial tax disclosures will only include issuer-level tax
items (namely, tax items imposed on the issuing entity) that affect how “reasonable
investors” calculate their own individual tax liabilities. Under such a regime, there
is no need to rely on the “average taxpayer” construct.
INTRODUCTION: APPLE’S BOND OFFERING AS AN ALLEGORY
On May 1, 2013, Apple, Inc. (Apple) made financial history with
its $17 billion bond offering,1 the largest-ever debt issuance by a
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Florida Levin College of Law. For helpful
guidance, comments and critique, I am grateful to Jennifer Bird-Pollan, Stu Cohen, David
Gamage, Joan Heminway, Michael Knoll, Leandra Lederman, Tom Lin, Randle Pollard,
Dexter Samida, Doug Shackelford, Danny Sokol, Emily Satterthwaite, and participants in
conferences and workshops at the Northwestern University School of Law, the University of
Tennessee College of Law, the 2013 SEALS Annual Conference, the 2013 Law and Society
Annual Meeting, and the 8th Annual Junior Tax Scholars Workshop. For invaluable research
assistance, I am indebted to Gus Gari. Any errors or omissions are my own.
1. See generally Apple, Inc., Prospectus Supplement (Form 424B2), at S-15 (May 1, 2013)
[hereinafter Apple’s Prospectus], available at http://investor.apple.com/secfiling.cfm?filing
id=1193125-13-184506&cik=320193.
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non-financial institution at the time.2 On page S-15 of the offering
document is a section titled “Certain U.S. Federal Income Tax Con-
siderations.”3 This section provides information concerning the
“U.S. federal income tax considerations of the ownership and dis-
position” of the bonds.4
Issuers in registered securities offerings are required to disclose
all information that a reasonable investor would deem material
when making an informed investment decision.5 Since investors
care about their after-tax returns on investments,6 information
about the tax costs associated with an investment could be consid-
ered material.7 Indeed, registrants are required to disclose to
investors all material tax consequences and to qualify the tax disclo-
sure with an opinion.8 The tax opinion must address each material
tax issue discussed in the disclosure, express a legal conclusion
about how the tax law applies to the facts of the particular offering
and its effect on investors’ tax consequences, and explain the basis
2. John Balassi & Josie Cox, Apple Wows Market With Record $17 Billion Bond Deal,
REUTERS (Apr. 30, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/30/us-apple-debt-idUS
BRE93T10B20130430. In September of the same year, Verizon Communications smashed
this record with a $49 billion bond offering. John Atkins, Verizon Smashes Record with $49B, 8-
Part Bond Offering, FORBES.COM (Sept. 11, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/spleverage/
2013/09/11/verizon-smashes-records-with-49b-8-part-bond-offering/ (last visited Aug. 21,
2014).
3. Apple Prospectus, supra note 1, at S-15.
4. Id.
5. See Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securities Regulation,
55 DUKE L. J. 711, 741 (2006). The disclosure documents the SEC regulates “disclose infor-
mation about the companies’ financial condition and business practices to help investors
make informed investment decisions.” SEC, The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Inves-
tors, Maintains Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Information, http://www.sec.gov/about/
whatwedo.shtml (last visited Aug. 1, 2014); see also Goshen & Gideon, supra, at 740 (providing
SEC disclosure regulations allow for greater “public disclosure” and “leads to fewer instances
of asymmetric information between traders” and more informed traders).
6. See MYRON S. SCHOLES ET AL., TAXES AND BUSINESS STRATEGY 2 (3d ed. 2004) (discuss-
ing why taxes influence investment decisions).
7. See, e.g., SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 19, 2011 WL 4957889 11–13 (Oct. 14, 2011),
available at http://www.sec.gov/interps/legal/cfslb19.htm (discussing when tax conse-
quences are “material” to investors) [hereinafter SEC Legal Bulletin]; see also William B.
Barker, SEC Registration of Public Offerings Under the Securities Act of 1933, 52 BUS. LAW. 65,
105–06 (1996) (discussing the proper disclosure of federal income tax consequences in regis-
tered offering as part of a general discussion on the system of mandatory disclosure, which is
intended to deliver investors with “accurate and current information” to support “fair and
honest securities market”). At the time of publication, Barker was a Senior Counsel to the
SEC’s Division of Corporate Finance. William B. Barker, SEC Registration of Public Offerings
Under the Securities Act of 1933, 52 BUS. LAW 65, 65 (1996).
8. SEC Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.601(b)(8) (requiring issuers to disclose to inves-
tors the “material” tax consequences associated with purchasing, holding and disposing of
the offered securities, and to support such disclosure with a legal opinion).
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for such a conclusion.9 Apple’s tax disclosure section responds to
this regulatory framework.
This Article suggests, however, that Apple’s tax disclosure in the
offering document does not provide any information that a “rea-
sonable investor” would deem material. In fact, the disclosure
provides little information at all, notwithstanding that the disclo-
sure comprises four densely written pages. Specifically, the third
sentence in Apple’s tax disclosure makes it clear that any tax conse-
quences discussed therein are only applicable to investors
purchasing the bonds in the initial offering.10 Investors in the sec-
ondary market received no guidance concerning the tax
consequences of investing in the bonds.
In addition, Apple’s tax disclosure explicitly excludes certain
classes of investors, including—among others—dealers in securi-
ties, financial institutions, insurance companies, and other types of
institutional investors.11 It is well documented, however, that securi-
ties in initial offerings are mostly allocated to the classes of
institutional investors excepted from Apple’s tax disclosure.12
The result is rather remarkable: Apple’s tax disclosure does not
describe the tax consequences to the investors that—as a practical
matter—are expected to purchase the bonds in the initial offering.
The tax disclosure also does not describe the tax consequences to
any investor that purchases the bonds in the secondary market. The
logical inference is that Apple’s tax disclosure section describes tax
consequences that are applicable to no one (or at least to only very
few). It is hard to imagine, therefore, that Apple’s tax disclosure
responds meaningfully to the rationales underlying mandatory tax
9. SEC Legal Bulletin, supra note 7, at 12.
10. See Apple Prospectus, supra note 1, at S-15 (“Except where noted, this summary deals
only with a note held as a capital asset by a beneficial owner who purchases the note on
original issuance at the first price . . . .”).
11. Id. (“This summary does not address all aspects of U.S. federal income taxes and
does not deal with all tax consequences that may be relevant to holders in light of their
personal circumstances or particular situations, such as . . . tax consequences to dealers in
securities or currencies, financial institutions, regulated investment companies, real estate
investment trusts, tax-exempt entities, insurance companies and traders in securities that
elect to use a mark-to-market method of tax accounting for their securities.”).
12. See SEC, Initial Public Offerings: Why Individual Investors Have Difficulty Getting Shares?,
http://www.sec.gov/answers/ipodiff.htm (last visited Aug. 1, 2014). There is ample evidence
that institutional investors are allocated most of the shares in IPOs (specifically on so called
“hot” IPOs). See, e.g., Jay R. Ritter & Ivo Welch, A Review of IPO Activity, Pricing, and Allocations,
57 J. FIN. 1795, 1808–15 (2002); see also Reena Aggarwal, Nagpurnanand R. Prabhala &
Manju Puri, Institutional Allocations in Initial Public Offerings: Empirical Evidence, 57 J. FIN. 1421,
1422 (2002) (finding that “institutions dominate IPO allocations”); Leland E. Crabbe &
Christopher M. Turner, Does Liquidity of a Debt Issue Increase With Its Size? Evidence from the
Corporate Bond and Medium-Term Note Markets, 50 J. FIN. 1719, 1722 (1995) (finding both cor-
porate bonds and medium-term notes “sold primarily to institutional investors”).
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disclosure. Nonetheless, Apple’s tax disclosure likely meets the for-
mal regulatory requirements applicable to nonfinancial tax
disclosures, as interpreted by the SEC.13
Apple is hardly unique. Most issuers limit the applicability of
their nonfinancial disclosures to investors purchasing securities in
the initial offering.14 At the same time, issuers draft the disclosures
to exclude most classes of investors that are expected to participate
in the initial offering.15 Non-initial offering documents similarly
contain language excluding most classes of investors from the scope
of nonfinancial tax disclosure.16 This makes the systemic utility of
nonfinancial tax disclosure tenuous.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I surveys nonfinancial tax
disclosure practices to elaborate on the apparent meaninglessness
of the regulatory framework. As a practical matter, issuers cannot
draft nonfinancial tax disclosures addressing the tax consequences
of all reasonable investors since reasonable investors are heteroge-
neous in their tax preferences.17 To address investors’
heterogeneity, issuers assume that all “reasonable investors” are also
“average taxpayers” and draft nonfinancial tax disclosures for the
benefit of these average taxpayers.18 Part I shows, however, that
drafting nonfinancial tax disclosures for the benefit of average tax-
payers amounts to a description of tax consequences that rarely (if
ever) matter to any investor.
Part II suggests that the “average taxpayer” concept is indefen-
sible for three important reasons. First, any nonfinancial tax
disclosure item could theoretically be favorable to one taxpayer but
detrimental to another, even if both are “reasonable investors.” Sig-
nificantly, the operation of efficient markets depends, in part, on
13. For a discussion of current practices as sanctioned by the SEC, see infra Part I.C.
14. See N.Y. BAR ASS’N TAX SECTION, REPORT ON TAX OPINIONS IN REGISTERED OFFERINGS,
3 (Apr. 4, 2012), available at http://apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/tribar/materials/
20120813000000.pdf [hereinafter N.Y. BAR REPORT].
15. Id. at 3. (“Accordingly, it is customary for the tax disclosure to (1) clearly state that it
does not address the tax consequences to such investors . . . .”). For examples of the exclu-
sion of institutional investors from the scope of the tax disclosure, see infra note 70 and
accompanying text.
16. N.Y. BAR REPORT, supra note 154, at 3.
17. This would necessitate “writ[ing] a treatise, which in addition to being cumbersome,
would be useless (from the perspective of disclosure) at best and misleading at worst.” Robert
P. Rothman, Tax Opinion Practice, 64 TAX LAW. 301, 383 (2010); see also infra notes 48–74 and
accompanying text.
18. N.Y. BAR REPORT, supra note 154, at 2 (“Although certain potential investors in a
registered offering are subject to special tax rules, the primary target of most tax disclosure in
registered offerings is the average investor expected to invest in the offered security or whose
vote is being solicited in connection with the offering, necessitating a balance between detail
and clarity such that the disclosure can be readily understood by that investor.”).
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assuming that all market participants interpret the same piece of
information identically.19 This, however, is not a reasonable as-
sumption in the nonfinancial tax disclosure context. Second,
drawing on financial literature, Part II shows that the tax prefer-
ences of “average taxpayers” do not impact capital markets’
efficient operation.20 Finally, courts have repeatedly implicitly re-
jected the concept of the average taxpayer.
Part III identifies the theoretical source of the regulatory failure.
Mandatory disclosure theory largely guides the SEC’s regulatory
paradigm and is grounded in the idea that issuers are best posi-
tioned to disclose—in the least socially-wasteful manner—relevant
facts about the issuing entity to investors who trade based on infor-
mation.21 In the context of nonfinancial tax disclosure, however, a
lot of the material information is either public or found with the
investors, not with the issuing entity. Thus, mandatory disclosure
theory—even if accepted at face value—does not support the cur-
rent nonfinancial tax disclosure requirements.
Part IV proposes a remedy to the regulatory failure. Assuming
that mandatory disclosure theory will guide securities regulation in
the foreseeable future,22 Part IV questions which types of nonfinan-
cial tax disclosures the theory requires. Part IV suggests that
mandatory disclosure theory only supports the disclosure of a nonfi-
nancial tax item if it is a “dual-level” tax item. A dual-level tax item
is an item that meets the following two requirements: (i) it is an
issuer-level tax item (meaning, a tax attribute of the issuing entity),
19. Eugene E. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J.
FIN. 383, 387–88 (1970) (“[A]ll agree on the implications of current information for the
current price and distributions of future prices of each security . . . . And disagreement
among investors about the implications of given information does not in itself imply market
inefficiency unless there are investors who can consistently make better evaluations of availa-
ble information than are implicit in market prices.”).
20. See discussion infra Part II.B.
21. Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 5, at 755–66 (describing why mandatory disclo-
sure is the method best suited to disseminating necessary information to the market); see also
Henry T.C. Hu, Reshaping Capital Markets: Twenty Years On, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1597, 1614–28
(2012) (describing such policy resulting in what he characterizes as the “intermediary depic-
tion model”); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70
VA. L. REV. 549, 638 (1984) (describing the benefits of mandatory disclosure in creating
“substantial savings for informed traders by collectivizing some of the costs of acquiring,
processing, and verifying information traders had expended”); John C. Coffee, Jr., Market
Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717, 733–34
(1984) (describing mandatory disclosure theory as the principal method to reduce social
waste and duplication of investor research of investments).
22. Joel Seligman, The Historical Need for A Mandatory Corporate Disclosure System, 9 J. CORP.
L. 1, 8–10 (1983) (describing SEC disclosure regulations developed by mandatory disclosure
theorists who believe that mandatory disclosure produces truthful information in the market-
place and deters fraud).
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and (ii) such item may affect the calculation of investor-level tax
liabilities.
The Conclusion calls on investors in registered securities to con-
sult their own tax advisors. Though disclosure documents regularly
include this advice, the SEC does not always view it favorably.23 That
advice is necessary, however, if mandatory tax disclosure is to en-
able investors to make informed investment decisions.
Many scholars have harshly criticized the assumptions underlying
the efficient operation of capital markets, as well as the mandatory
disclosure paradigm, primarily from the point of view of behavioral
finance.24 While this body of critique definitely applies in the tax
context, it is not this Article’s point of view. Rather, this Article ar-
gues that the problem with tax disclosure is more fundamental: due
to the special nature of tax law, the current nonfinancial tax disclo-
sure framework is not justifiable under the best possible theoretical
assumptions that otherwise support mandatory disclosure.
I. THE FAILURES OF NONFINANCIAL TAX DISCLOSURES
This Part demonstrates the functional failures of nonfinancial tax
disclosure practice in registered securities offerings. Subpart A de-
scribes tax disclosure requirements and their intended purpose to
support capital market efficiency. Subpart B explains the main hur-
dle practitioners face when drafting nonfinancial tax disclosures:
investors’ heterogeneous tax preferences. Subpart C surveys market
practices responding to investors’ tax heterogeneity and concludes
that such practices do not advance market efficiency. Subpart D
suggests that such practices are possibly detrimental to market
efficiency.
A. Tax Disclosure Requirements and Rationales
Since the enactment of the 1930s Securities Acts, the SEC’s regu-
latory paradigm has relied on the concept that information
23. Robert P. Rothman, supra note 17, at 387 (“Recently, the author has encountered
(and has heard anecdotal reports that others have encountered) resistance from SEC review-
ers to telling people to consult their own tax advisors.”)
24. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions, and Securities Regulation: Market
Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 851, 857–72 (1992); see also David A. Hoffman, The
“Duty” to Be a Rational Shareholder, 90 MINN. L. REV. 537, 545–62 (2006); Stephen J. Choi &
A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1, 7–16 (2003); Tom C. W.
Lin, A Behavioral Framework for Securities Risk, 34 SEA. U. L. REV. 325, 336–49 (2011).
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disclosure is the cornerstone of an efficient market.25 The emer-
gence and widespread acceptance of the Efficient Capital Market
Hypothesis (ECMH) in the 1970s “bolstered the case for [a] robust
informational foundation.”26 Under the ECMH, an efficient market
is one in which securities prices “ ‘fully reflect’ available informa-
tion.”27 Thus, information supports accurate pricing of securities in
the secondary market and helps prospective investors assess securi-
ties prices in the primary market.
Molded with ECMH assumptions as its building blocks, the U.S.
securities regulatory regime requires issuers in registered securities
offerings to disclose all information that a “reasonable investor”
may deem “material” for the purposes of making informed invest-
ment decisions.28 The disclosure must be accurate and concise.29
Tax information is no exception. Taxes reduce the net return on
an investment and may affect investment decisions. A reasonable
investor could, therefore, consider the tax costs associated with an
investment a material piece of information.30
25. See Hu, supra note 21, at 1614 (“The federal regulation of capital markets and corpo-
rations, which began with the enactment of the Securities Act in 1933, has largely been
animated by a single philosophy: disclosure”); JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL
STREET: A HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE
FINANCE 39–40 (3d ed. 2003) (discussing the Wheat Report that the SEC adopt objective
standards regarding registration and disclosure in the formation of the securities laws); Don-
ald D. Langevoort & G. Mitu Gulati, The Muddled Duty to Disclose Under Rule 10B-5, 57 VAND. L.
REV. 1639, 1639 (2004) (describing disclosure as the “heart” of the federal securities regula-
tory regime).
26. Hu, supra note 21, at 1606. Accord id. at 1616 (“[ECMH] came to provide a social-
science-based justification for the disclosure paradigm, and strongly influence the paradigm
implementation”).
27. Fama, supra note 19, at 384; see also Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 21, at 549
(describing the process by which information supports efficient markets and arguing the
mandatory disclosure is the most efficient way to achieve the necessary dissemination of such
information).
28. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771 (1998) (providing causes of action based in untrue or
omitted statements of material fact); 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2 (2009) (“The term ‘material’ . . .
limits the information required to those matters to which there is a substantial likelihood that
a reasonable investor would attach importance in determining whether to buy or sell the
securities registered.”). For that purpose, information is “material” if “there is a substantial
likelihood that a reasonable [investor] would consider it important,” a standard that is met
when the information at issue alters “the ‘total mix’ of information made available.” TCS
Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 445, 449 (1976); see also Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485
U.S. 224, 983 (1988) (adopting the TSC Industries standard of materiality for the § 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 context).
29. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.421(d)(2) (requiring issuers to present information “in a clear,
concise and understandable manner”).
30. Notwithstanding that tax information may be material to investors, there is a neces-
sary second-order question: whether the disclosure of tax information should be mandatory
or voluntary. The U.S. securities regulatory regime is a mandatory one. In this context, this
Subpart asks whether the current framework of mandatory disclosure of nonfinancial tax
items supports market efficiency. The Article later questions the contours of the theories
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Mandated tax disclosures are broadly divisible into two catego-
ries: financial and nonfinancial disclosures.31 These are discussed
below.
The first category of tax disclosure is financial tax disclosure. A
significant expense item that affects the issuer’s value or
creditworthiness is the issuer-borne taxes; for example, corporate
taxes the corporate issuers paid.32 Such considerations affect a rea-
sonable investor’s investment decisions.33 Financial disclosure
regulation, primarily Regulation S-X, requires issuers to account for
their own income tax expenses in the financial statements.34
Generally, Regulation S-X requires that financial statements dis-
close the issuer’s income tax benefits and expenses and explain why
the issuer reported such benefits and expenses at this specific
time.35 Additionally, financial statements must disclose the entity’s
total income at the end of the taxable year and the taxes incurred
for the year, including the applicable tax rates and the method the
corporation used in computing the taxable amount.36 Regulation S-
X discusses little else, instead referencing Financial Accounting
Standards Board (FASB) Accounting Standards Codification Topic
740 (entitled “Income Taxes”) and directing that tax disclosure
statements be consistent with the financial accounting standards
therein.37 This Article does not propose any changes relating to fi-
nancial tax disclosures.38
supporting mandatory disclosure, in order to describe the particular nonfinancial tax items
that should be mandatorily disclosed to support market efficiency. See infra Part III.
31. Other than the general rules of nonfinancial tax disclosures, specific nonfinancial
tax disclosure rules are applied in specific contexts. For example, mutual fund disclosures
must report the after tax return to investors. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.482(d)(4).
32. See Richard D. Pomp, The Disclosure of State Corporate Income Tax Data: Turning the
Clock Back to the Future, 22 CAP. U. L. REV. 373, 408 (1993).
33. See, e.g., Notice of Adoption and Amendment to Regulation S-X to Provide for Im-
proved Disclosure of Income Tax Expense, SEC Release No. AS-149, 3 SEC Docket 155 (Nov.
28, 1973) (“The objectives of these disclosure requirements are to enable users of financial
statements to understand better the basis for the registrant’s tax accounting and the degree
to which and the reasons why it is able to operate at a different level of tax expense than that
which would be incurred at the statutory tax rate. By developing such an understanding,
users will be able to distinguish more easily between one time and continuing tax advantages
enjoyed by a company and to appraise the significance of changing effective tax rates. In
addition, users will be able to gain additional insights into the current and prospective cash
drain associated with payment of income taxes.”).
34. 26 C.F.R. § 210.4-08(h).
35. 26 C.F.R. § 210.4-08(h)(1).
36. 26 C.F.R. § 210.4-08(h)(2).
37. 26 C.F.R. § 210.4-08(h)(3).
38. Other scholars have addressed such issues. See, e.g., Linda M. Beale, Putting SEC Heat
on Audit Firms and Corporate Tax Shelters: Responding to Tax Risk with Sunshine, Shame and Strict
Liability, 29 J. CORP. L. 219, 258–60 (2004) (suggesting increased SEC bans to prevent audi-
tors from providing tax services to their clients in the wake of the Enron scandal); Gary A.
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The second category of required tax disclosures is nonfinancial
tax items, which SEC Regulation S-K Item 601(b)(8) primarily gov-
erns.39 Under Item 601(b)(8), registered securities issuers are
required to disclose to the investor—and to qualify such disclosure
with a legal opinion—all material tax consequences associated with
purchasing, holding, and selling the offered securities.40 This in-
cludes taxes that investors are expected to pay on their own account
(for example, taxes imposed on the investor for dividends received
from the issuer). Several additional regulations require the disclo-
sure of other types of nonfinancial tax information.41 In addition,
several basket provisions require the disclosure of any non-enumer-
ated “material” information and thus may apply to nonfinancial tax
items if they are material.42
While there is no explicit legal requirement to disclose nonfinan-
cial tax consequences that are not “material,” the SEC apparently
takes the position that such tax consequences must be disclosed
(though not necessarily supported by an opinion).43 Indeed, it is
standard practice to disclose certain nonfinancial tax items the SEC
or tax practitioners consider immaterial.44 For example, tax conse-
quences associated with holding and selling common stock are not
McGill & Edmund Outslay, Did Enron Pay Taxes: Deciphering a Corporation’s Tax Status Using
Financial Statement Information 9–11 (July 25, 2002) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=320240 (suggesting reforms to gaps be-
tween income reporting and a publicly traded corporation’s tax status); see also Harold S.
Peckron, Watchdogs That Failed to Bark: Standards of Tax Review After Enron 5 FLA. TAX REV. 853,
908–13 (2002) (highlighting greater scrutiny for tax review standards and suggested reforms
for greater disclosure especially relating to tax shelters).
39. See SEC Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.
40. Id. § 229.601(b)(8). An alternative for an opinion is an IRS ruling on the matters
described in the disclosure. Id.
41. See, e.g., id. § 229.1016(h) (requiring the attachment of tax opinion supporting the
tax consequences in M&A transactions); see also id. § 230.482(d)(4) (requiring mutual funds
disclosure to contain after tax returns to unit holders).
42. These basket provisions, or “catch-all provisions,” refer to any provisions in the dis-
closure statements that a “reasonable investor” might deem “material.” For example, Rule
10b-5 makes it unlawful to make any material misstatement or the omission of a material fact.
Id. § 240.10b-5(b). Additionally, Rule 14a-9 has a similar “materiality” standard in the context
of proxy statements, making it unlawful to make any written or oral statement in a proxy
statement or other communication that is either “false or misleading with respect to any
material fact” or “omits to state any material face necessary in order to make statements . . .
not false or misleading . . . or necessary to correct any statement.” Id. § 240.14a-9(a).
43. See SEC Legal Bulletin, supra note 7, at 12 (“In such cases, while the registrant must
provide accurate and complete disclosure concerning the tax consequences to investors, it
does not have to expertize the disclosure by providing an opinion of counsel or
accountant.”).
44. See N.Y. BAR REPORT, supra note 14, at 4–5 (stating that “virtually any tax disclosure in
a registered offering, whether or not the offering requires a tax opinion, will include a discus-
sion of federal income tax consequences that are not ‘material to an investor’ as well as other
factual information.”).
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considered material.45 Nonetheless, disclosure documents for com-
mon stock offerings regularly contain a nonfinancial tax disclosure
section.46 Nonfinancial tax consequences are usually described in a
dedicated section of the offering document, titled “Material Fed-
eral Income Tax Consequences.”47
To summarize, tax disclosure is an integral part of the U.S. secur-
ities regulatory framework. Taxes affect the net return on an
investment and, therefore, may be material to reasonable investors.
Taxes imposed on the issuing entity are part of the issuing entity’s
financial statements. Taxes imposed on an investor relating to an
investment in securities are disclosed in the nonfinancial tax disclo-
sure section. The latter is the focal point of this Article.
B. Nonfinancial Tax Disclosures and the Problem of
Investors’ Tax Heterogeneity
The nonfinancial tax disclosure requirements put issuers in an
impossible position. Even if investors are all “reasonable” and they
all invest in the same security, different investors still face different
tax consequences from their investments. For example, investors
face different tax rates depending on their tax bracket, tax status,48
or how long they held the security.49 Some investors may have losses
45. See id. at 5 (noting that “the ‘plain vanilla’ tax consequences to investors of holding
and selling the common stock” are not required to be disclosed because they are not consid-
ered “material”). Notwithstanding their immateriality, the tax consequences of “plain vanilla”
stock offerings are “typically describe[d]” in offering documents. Id.
46. Id. (“[A]lthough a mere offering of common stock issued for cash does not involve
any tax consequences that are ‘material’ to an investor,” the tax disclosure will typically de-
scribe the ‘plain vanilla’ tax consequences for non-U.S. investors of owning and selling the
common stock.”).
47. Other titles used are “Material Federal Income Tax Considerations” and “Material
Federal Tax Consequences,” among other similar titles.
48. For example, while most investors are only taxed upon realization (usually upon the
disposition of securities), those who qualify as “dealers” in securities are taxed on a “mark-to-
market” basis. See I.R.C. § 475 (all references herein to the IRC or the “Code” are to the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, 26 U.S.C. § 1986).
49. The gain on the disposition of capital asset (such as a publicly trade security) held
for a period of more than a year is taxed at long-term capital gains rate (currently fifteen
percent for most taxpayers and twenty percent for taxpayers in the top marginal tax bracket),
while the gain on the disposition of a capital asset held for a year or less, is taxed at short-
term capital gains rate (which is the same on the ordinary tax-bracket of the taxpayer). I.R.C.
§ 1(h).
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they can use to offset gains50 while others do not have losses or oth-
erwise are unable to take advantage of such losses.51 Some may face
different tax regimes altogether because they are classified as “for-
eign” or “domestic” taxpayers.52 Investors’ classification as
“corporations,” “individuals,” “partnerships,”53 or any other tax law
category, inevitably changes their tax consequences.
The sale of common stock in the public market demonstrates the
difficulty of drafting tax disclosure for the benefit of a heterogene-
ous body of taxpayers. Generally, upon disposition of a capital asset,
a taxpayer must recognize income in an amount equal to the differ-
ence between the amount realized and the taxpayer’s tax basis in
the asset.54 The tax basis of a publicly traded stock is, in most cases,
the amount paid for the stock.55 While such a rule is easy to de-
scribe, including it in a disclosure is meaningless because the rule’s
application is heavily dependent on each investor’s particular tax
situation.
As an initial matter, not all investors are taxable upon the disposi-
tion of their securities. Certain categories of investors are tax-
exempt, assuming they meet certain requirements.56 Different tax-
exempt statuses carry different requirements. An issuer cannot
clearly and concisely describe in the tax disclosure section all the
requirements that different types of investors must meet to be
granted tax-exempt status. Assume for a moment that all investors
are taxable investors; under such circumstances issuers could draft
50. Taxpayers calculate their capital gains and losses on a netting basis. I.R.C. § 1222.
For example, a taxpayer who realized a long-term capital loss on the disposition of one secur-
ity will be able to use such loss to shield income from the disposition of another security,
which is expected to generate long-term capital gains. A taxpayer with no such loss offset, is
expected to carry a heavier tax burden on the disposition of the same security at a gain. In
addition, individuals are allowed to offset up to $3,000 of capital losses against their ordinary
income. I.R.C. § 1211(b). Unused capital losses can be carried over to future years (indefi-
nitely), and can be carried back (on a limited basis) to offset capital gains income. I.R.C.
§ 1212.
51. I.R.C. § 172.
52. While domestic taxpayers are taxed in the United States on all income from
whatever source derived, foreign taxpayers are generally taxed only on income sourced
within the United States. I.R.C. §§ 871, 881. In most cases, income from the disposition of
stock is sourced at the place of residence of the seller. See I.R.C. § 865(a). Thus, income from
the disposition of security listed for public trading will be taxed to a U.S. resident, but ex-
empt to a foreign resident.
53. Different types of entities may face different tax rules. Thus the entity classification
of an investor can affect the tax results. See discussion infra note 230 and accompanying text.
54. I.R.C. § 1001(a).
55. See I.R.C. § 1012(a).
56. Multiple types of entities that qualify for tax-exempt status actively participate in
financial markets such as pension funds, university endowments, charitable organizations,
governmental entities, and so on.
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a disclosure under that assumption.57 Drafters can add qualifying
language to exclude tax-exempt taxpayers from the scope of the
disclosure.58
However, excluding tax-exempt investors from the scope of the
disclosure does not make the drafting task easier. Gains from the
sale of a capital asset (such as publicly-traded stocks) are subject to
various tax rates. Capital gains are taxed at preferential rates, pro-
vided the security was held for longer than a year.59 If the security is
held for one year or less, then the investor’s gains are considered
short-term capital gains and taxed at the investor’s marginal tax
rate.60 An issuer drafting a disclosure cannot know how long an in-
vestor will hold the stock before selling it. A disclosure addressing
such an issue must take an algorithmic approach: “If your holding
period in the stock is ‘X,’ then the tax consequence is ‘Y;’ if your
holding period is ‘N,’ then the tax consequence is ‘M,’” and so on.
Practitioners sometimes use this approach, which substantially com-
plicates disclosure drafting.61
Even if one further simplifies by assuming that all investors
purchase and sell the security on the same day, not all investors face
the same tax consequences. Drafting remains difficult since differ-
ent types of taxable investors face wholly different tax regimes. For
example, dealers in securities must mark-to-market their securities
each year and pay tax to the extent the securities appreciated in
57. Not all investors are necessarily taxable investors because tax-exempt investors are
major players in the U.S. securities markets. For example, a recent Goldman Sachs survey
suggests that nontaxable retirement funds own as much as seventeen percent of the entire
value of the U.S. equity market. See DAVID J. KOSTIN ET AL., Goldman Sachs, 2013 U.S. EQUITY
OUTLOOK: SELECTIVITY SEEKING GROWTH 17 fig. 24 (Nov. 28, 2012), available at http://www
.mauldineconomics.com/images/uploads/overmyshoulder/Goldman_Sachs_-_US_Equity_
Outlook.pdf. Pension funds also own six percent of the total U.S. bond market. Id. at 19 fig.
31. On the whole, as recently as 2003, institutional investors controlled over 59.2 percent of
the equity market ($7.97 trillion) versus 28.4% ($376 billion) in 1980. Thomas J. Chem-
manur et al., The Role of Institutional Investors In Seasoned Equity Offerings, 94 J. FIN. ECON. 384,
385 (2009). These institutions included multiple types of tax-exempt investors, such as uni-
versity endowments, pension funds, and governmental entities.
58. Carve-outs and qualifications are explicitly allowed under the regulations, as long as
the tax opinion qualifying the disclosure clearly describes such carve-outs. See SEC Regulation
S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.601(b)(8) (“Such tax opinions may be conditioned or may be qualified,
so long as such conditions and qualifications are adequately described in the filing.”).
59. See discussion supra note 49 and accompanying text.
60. See supra note 49.
61. See, e.g., Groupon, Inc., SEC Registration Statement: Material United States Federal
Tax Consequences 133 (Form S-1) (Aug. 10, 2011) (“Upon the sale or other disposition of
our Class A common stock, you will generally recognize capital gain or loss equal to the
difference between the amount realized and your adjusted tax basis in such stock. Such capi-
tal gain or loss will generally be long-term capital gain or loss if your holding period in respect of
the stock is more than one year.” (emphasis added)) [hereinafter Groupon Registration
Statement].
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value,62 regardless of whether the securities are sold.63 When deal-
ers eventually sell the securities, they make adjustments to account
for gains or losses previously recognized under the mark-to-market
method.64 Thus, the taxable gain to a dealer is necessarily different
than the taxable gain of non-dealers who sold the securities at the
same time, for the same price.
Dealers in securities are only one example of many particularly
classified taxpayers who are subject to unique tax rules.65 In order
to make a tax disclosure accurate, issuers must theoretically disclose
the different tax consequences different types of investors face. It is
doubtful that such a disclosure could be made “concise.”
The description above is only the tip of the iceberg and does not
discuss innumerable issues that may cause investors’ tax prefer-
ences to diverge. The bottom line, however, is clear: the tax
consequences of securities investments vary among investors, even
if all are “reasonable investors,” and even if one makes numerous
simplifying assumptions.
C. The Market-Created Construct of the “Average Taxpayer”
Practitioners, obviously, cannot draft tax disclosures that explain
all conceivable tax consequences and account for each investor’s
particular tax position. This would necessitate “writ[ing] a treatise,
which in addition to being cumbersome, would be useless (from
the perspective of disclosure) at best and misleading at worst.”66
In the face of overwhelming tax heterogeneity, a practical draft-
ing approach was needed. A recent New York State Bar Association
(NYSBA) report articulated the Tax Bar position that “the primary
target of most tax disclosure in registered offerings is the average
62. Generally, under a mark-to-market (MTM) method of accounting a taxpayer is
deemed to have sold the asset subject to MTM for the asset’s fair market value (FMV) at the
end of the taxable year. The taxpayer then recognized gain or loss equal to the difference
between the FMV of the asset and the taxpayer’s basis in the asset.  The taxpayer’s basis is
consequently adjusted to account for the deemed sale.  For example, assume a dealer in
securities bought a share for $10 on Day One of Year One. On the last day of Year One the
share’s FMV is $12. The dealer is deemed to sell the stock on the last day of Year One and
immediately repurchase it for the share’s FMV. Thus, the dealer must recognize gain of $2 in
Year One ($12 FMV minus a basis of $10). As of Day One of Year Two the dealer’s new basis
in the stock is $12.
63. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
64. See id.
65. Other types of investors subject to specific taxation rules include, inter alia, Real
Estate Investment Trusts (REITs), Regulated Investment Companies (RICs), insurance com-
panies, and tax-exempt investors.
66. Rothman, supra note 17, at 383.
14 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 48:1
investor expected to invest in the offered security.”67 Practitioners
draft investor-level tax disclosures for the benefit of an imaginary
investor facing average tax consequences. This Article refers to this
market-created construct as the “average taxpayer.”68 The “average
taxpayer” construct lacks an official definition and is created using
elimination. In practical terms, the average taxpayer-investor repre-
sents what remains after accounting for all the limiting language
and qualifications regularly used in disclosure statements.
The market pares down the body of investors and their tax con-
cerns to reach the “average taxpayer” in three ways: (1) limiting the
personal scope of investors to “average” taxpayers; (2) limiting the
substantive scope of taxes described to “average tax consequences”
that “average taxpayers” face; and (3) limiting the scope of inves-
tors’ reliance (allowing taxpayers to rely on the disclosure only to
the extent that the tax consequences described are indeed “aver-
age”). The following discussion shows that the three qualifications
functionally remove most of the significance from nonfinancial tax
disclosures.
1. Limiting the Personal Scope of Nonfinancial Tax Disclosures
The most obvious way issuers limit the scope of nonfinancial tax-
disclosures is excluding certain “non-average” taxpayers from the
disclosure’s application. Issuers do so in two ways. First, in initial
offering disclosures, issuers almost always limit the disclosure’s ap-
plicability to investors who purchased the securities in the initial
offering.69 Second, in both initial and non-initial offerings, as well
as periodic disclosure documents, disclosures are made expressly
inapplicable to certain types of “sophisticated investors” who are
subject to unique tax rules (generally, institutional investors).70 For
67. See N.Y. BAR REPORT, supra note 14, at 2 (emphasis added).
68. The N.Y. Bar Report does not use the term “average taxpayer.” Rather, it refers to
the “average” tax consequences a “reasonable investor” faces. This Article does not use the
term “average investor” in order to avoid confusion with the term “reasonable investor.”
69. See, e.g., Third Point Reinsurance Ltd., SEC Registration Statement: Certain Tax
Considerations (Form S-1), 171 (Jul. 15, 2013); see also Stock Building Supply Holdings, Inc.,
SEC Registration Statement: Certain U.S. Federal Income Tax Considerations to Non-U.S.
Holders (Form S-1), 125 (Jun. 14, 2013) (“The following is a discussion of certain U.S. fed-
eral income tax consequences of the purchase, ownership and disposition of our common
stock . . . in this offering.”); see also, SFX Entertainment, Inc., SEC Registration Statement:
Material United States Tax Considerations for Non-United States Holders of Common Stock
(Form S-1), 128 (Jun. 25, 2013).
70. See, e.g., Sophiris Bio Inc., SEC Form S-1: United States and Canadian Income Tax Consid-
erations, 125 (Feb 15, 2013); see also Third Point Reinsurance Ltd., SEC Registration
Statement: Certain Tax Considerations (Form S-1), 171 (Jul. 15, 2013).
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example, excluded investors include insurance companies that face
specific tax rules applicable only the insurance industry.71 Also ex-
cluded are Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs),72 Regulated
Investment Companies (RICs),73 dealers in securities,74 and other
entities the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) specifically defines.75
On its face, this exclusionary approach fails to meet the basic
requirement that disclosures address the material tax consequences
for reasonable investors. While the identity of the reasonable inves-
tor remains elusive,76 it is clearly a generic term, intending to
represent “the idealized, utility-maximizing person from neoclassi-
cal economic theory.”77 Excluding specific types of investors, the
disclosure no longer addresses all material tax information. Any
taxpayer facing “non-average” tax consequences may nevertheless
count as a “reasonable investor,” yet the tax consequences material
to such an investor are not described in the disclosure.
For example, a very limited number of investors are able to par-
ticipate in initial offerings; most purchase and trade in the
secondary market.78 Thus, limiting a disclosure’s scope to investors
in the initial offering makes the disclosure applicable only to an
extremely narrow set of market participants, excluding most “rea-
sonable investors.”
Excluding institutional investors from initial public offering
(IPO) disclosures further exacerbates the problem. While institu-
tional investors are understandably not regarded as “average,” they
are usually the investors in initial offerings.79 In practice, therefore,
IPO nonfinancial tax disclosures do not describe the tax conse-
quences for the investors purchasing the securities in the IPO.
Additionally, the disclosures fail to describe tax consequences for
an investor that purchases the securities in the secondary market.
In other words, the tax consequences described in initial offering
disclosures are, for the most part, applicable to no one. Whether
71. See I.R.C. §§ 801-848.
72. See I.R.C. §§ 856-859.
73. See I.R.C. §§ 851-855.
74. See I.R.C. § 475.
75. Indeed, according to the NYSBA Report, an “average” taxpayer is not a taxpayer
subject to special tax regimes “such as, for example, insurance companies, financial institu-
tions, dealers in securities, certain traders in securities, tax exempt organizations,
partnerships and equity owners of partnerships, and investors that hold the security as part of
an integrated transaction, hedge or straddle.” N.Y. BAR REPORT, supra note 14, at 4–5.
76. See Tom C. Lin, The New Investor, 60 UCLA L. REV. 678, 694–96 (2013).
77. Id. at 695; see also Hoffman, supra note 24, at 540–42 (discussing the traits of the
“reasonable investor”).
78. See, e.g., supra note 12 and accompanying text.
79. See, e.g., id.
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such an insubstantial disclosure performs any meaningful regula-
tory function is questionable.
Exclusion of many types of investors from non-initial offering
documents, such as periodic disclosures or disclosures involving ex-
change offers, mergers, and other transactions, is also difficult to
rationalize. Apparently, the SEC does not object to practices limit-
ing the personal scope of nonfinancial tax disclosures.80
2. Limiting the Substantive Scope of Nonfinancial
Tax Disclosures
Issuers commonly limit the scope of nonfinancial tax disclosures
to federal income tax consequences alone.81 Other taxes are explic-
itly excluded from the scope of the disclosures. From a practical
point of view, this makes sense since federal income taxes are prob-
ably most broadly applicable for securities traded in U.S. markets.82
Federal income taxes apply to most U.S. investors and could be re-
garded as “average” tax consequences.
The problem, however, is that this approach excludes many
other types of taxes that may have “material” effects on the after-tax
value of a security.83 For example, state and local taxes may have a
material effect on the return of an investment84 but are regularly
excluded from the disclosure’s scope.
80. The SEC even implicitly approved such practices when it states issuers could condi-
tion tax disclosures “provided the conditions or qualifications are adequately described in
the registration statement.” See SEC Legal Bulletin, supra note 7.
81. See, e.g., Pattern Energy Group, Inc., SEC Registration Statement Material U.S. Fed-
eral Income Tax Considerations for Holders of Our Class A Common Shares (Form S-1), 190
(Aug. 9, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1561660/000119312513329269/
d564947ds1.htm (“The effects of other U.S. federal tax laws, such as estate and gift tax laws,
and any applicable state, local or foreign tax laws are not discussed.”); see also Ringcentral,
Inc., SEC Registration Statement: Material U.S. Federal Income Tax Consequences to Non-
U.S. Holders of Our Class A Common Stock (Form S-1), 144 (Aug. 26, 2013), http://www.sec
.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1384905/000119312513346260/d310247ds1.htm (“This discus-
sion is not a complete analysis of all potential U.S. federal income tax consequences relating
thereto, nor does it address any estate and gift tax consequences or any tax consequences
arising under any state, local or non-U.S. tax laws, or any other U.S. federal tax laws.”).
82. For example, U.S. residents own eighty-seven percent of the value of the U.S. equity
market. See KOSTIN ET AL., supra note 57, at 17 (showing that foreign investors own only
thirteen percent of U.S. equity markets). As such, federal income taxes are broadly applica-
ble to investors in U.S. markets.
83. See, e.g., supra note 76 and accompanying text.
84. See Pomp, supra note 32, at 373 (1993); see also Giles Sutton et al., State Tax Issues
Regarding FASB Interpretation No. 48: Accounting for Uncertainty in Income Taxes, J. MULTISTATE
TAX & INCENTIVES 26–27 (Jan. 2007).
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Whether language limiting the scope of the disclosure to federal
income tax consequences meets the regulations’ literal require-
ments is unclear. Item 601(b)(8) of Regulation S-K clearly
prescribes that an opinion must accompany nonfinancial tax disclo-
sures, “where the tax consequences are material to an investor.”85 The
requirement, on its face, is not limited to federal tax or income tax
matters.
The SEC apparently accepts the use of such substantive limita-
tions. In a recent Legal Staff Bulletin (the Bulletin), the SEC
suggests that the tax opinion (and hence the disclosure) must cover
“only material federal tax consequences.”86 Thus, the SEC permits
nondisclosure of any material non-federal tax consequences. Distin-
guishing between the disclosure of material federal taxes and the
nondisclosure of material non-federal taxes is inconsistent with the
regulatory regime’s underlying purposes, because the regulatory ra-
tionale calls for the disclosure of all material consequences.
Nonetheless, the SEC’s approach engenders sympathy. Practi-
cally, issuers cannot meet the regulations’ literal requirements. For
example, the disclosure of state tax consequences could only meet
the literal requirements of the regulations if the tax consequences
to residents of all fifty states are described. Such a disclosure would
be unmanageable, and the SEC’s guidance provides much-needed
relief in this context. Unfortunately, no principled standard exists,
either in practice or in the SEC’s guidance, to explain the inclusion
of certain types of tax consequences but the exclusion of others.
The tentative conclusion, therefore, is that the substantive limita-
tion on the scope of disclosed tax consequences is not in line with
the purposes of securities disclosure. At the same time, correcting
this problem as a matter of practice is difficult.
3. Limiting the Scope of Reliance on Tax Disclosure
“It is an article of faith among tax advisors that any opinion pre-
pared for the benefit of a large number of third parties who may
have different individual tax postures should include language urg-
ing each such third party to consult his own tax advisor.”87
Practically every tax disclosure in securities offerings contains such
85. SEC Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.601(b)(8).
86. SEC Legal Bulletin, supra note 7 (proscribing that opinions should address all fed-
eral income tax consequences and prohibiting limiting the opinion to “certain” or
“principal” tax consequences as it “raise[s] a concern that the author of the opinion may be
omitting a material tax consequences”).
87. Rothman, supra note 17, at 386.
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language urging investors to seek tax advice tailored to their own
particular tax circumstances.88 Effectively, this language reduces an
investor’s possible reliance on the disclosure and suggests that any
disclosed tax item may apply differently to each investor.
The SEC views reliance-limiting language negatively, however.89
On the one hand, the SEC acknowledges that the cautionary lan-
guage is intended to address investors’ tax heterogeneity.90 On the
other hand, it does not accept qualifying language that, in effect,
disclaims investors’ reliance on the tax matters described in the dis-
closures.91 The SEC’s approach assumes that investors are able to
rely on issuers’ disclosures.92 As previously indicated, however, cur-
rent disclosure practice essentially describes tax consequences that
are relevant to no (or only a few) investors. Therefore, there is little
in nonfinancial tax disclosures upon which a reasonable investor
can rely, with or without consulting his own tax advisor.
If anything, urging investors to consult their tax advisors is neces-
sary. An investor’s own tax advisor is arguably the only source for
individually relevant, reliable nonfinancial tax information regard-
ing federal, state, and local income and non-income tax
consequences.
As described above, disclosures contain very limited nonfinancial
tax information. The disclosed information applies only to a very
narrow category of investors. Moreover, it is unclear to what extent
investors can rely on the disclosed information. Thus, it is difficult
to see how current tax disclosure practices respond meaningfully to
the U.S. securities regulation regime’s most basic rationales.
88. Id. (“Typically, tax disclosure includes (often as part of the introductory boilerplate)
a general statement to the effect that persons should consult their own tax advisors as to the
application to them of the rules discussed therein.”).
89. Id. at 387–88 (describing the SEC negative view of disclosure language urging inves-
tors to consult their own tax advisors).
90. SEC Legal Bulletin supra note 7, at 14 (“It is common practice, however, for an
opinion to recommend that investors consult their own tax advisors or counsel, particularly
with respect to the personal tax consequences of the investment, which may vary for investors
in different tax situations.”).
91. Id. (“The staff does not object to this practice so long as the recommendation does
not disclaim reliance for tax matters on which counsel has opined.”).
92. Id. (“Investors are entitled to rely on the opinion expressed. . . . The staff does not
object to this practice [of suggesting that investors should seek their own tax advisors] so
long as the recommendation does not disclaim reliance for tax matters on which counsel has
opined.”)
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D. Current Nonfinancial Tax Disclosure is Detrimental
to the Regulatory Rationale
The description above demonstrates that, given investors’ hetero-
geneous tax preferences, it is impossible to comply in practice with
the current regulatory regime controlling nonfinancial tax disclo-
sures. In turn, market practice and SEC guidance undermine most
of the disclosure’s relevance to any particular investor in seeking to
make drafting manageable.
This does not mean that the disclosure is completely meaning-
less. Arguably, a “reasonable investor” should be able to discern
which parts of the disclosure are relevant given the investor’s partic-
ular position. In that sense, the disclosure usefully put investors on
notice regarding certain tax information, even though most of the
information does not apply to the investor reading it.
Regulatory reform is still needed, however. Specifically, this Arti-
cle argues that current nonfinancial tax disclosure practices fail to
support, and may actually disrupt, the dissemination of information
to the market, create unnecessary transaction costs, and divert valu-
able regulatory resources to the enforcement of largely-meaningless
requirements.
1. Material Information is Not Disclosed and Disclosed
Information May be Misleading
As Subparts A through C show, very few reasonable investors can
find useful information in tax disclosures. This void reasonably sug-
gests that some information that is material is sacrificed for the sake
of practical drafting. For example, once the drafter excludes cer-
tain institutional investors from the disclosure’s scope, the drafter
does not need to describe tax consequences, even material ones,
that affect only those investors. The alternative—to disclose all con-
ceivable tax consequences—is also undesirable as those disclosures
would be enormous, extremely costly to issuers, and more likely to
confuse than help most investors.93
Moreover, investors that do read current disclosures may errone-
ously assume that the tax consequences described therein apply to
them. It is doubtful that all “reasonable investors” are also tax ex-
perts. It is more likely that reasonable investors do not completely
93. In re Progress Energy, Inc., 371 F. Supp. 2d 548, 553–54 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (reasoning
that an “excruciatingly lengthy and complicated disclosure” may confuse investors and re-
present a practically unfeasible amount of disclosure for issuers to handle).
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comprehend the intricacies of U.S. tax rules. For example, whether
an investor is subject to the Alternative Minimum Tax (the AMT)
may affect the tax consequences associated with investment in se-
curities. Because of the AMT’s unique consequences, disclosure
documents regularly exclude taxpayers who are subject to the AMT
from the disclosure’s scope.94 Thus, a reasonable investor, unaware
that she is subject to the AMT, may erroneously rely on disclosed
nonfinancial tax information. In that sense, the SEC rule results in
potentially misleading disclosures. Any incorrect action based on
the disclosure is not the fault of the issuer but of the so-called “aver-
age taxpayer” who fails to realize the potential variances created by
an incredibly complex system of tax laws.
2. The Practice is Wasteful for Both Issuers and Investors
Nonfinancial tax disclosures carry costs for both issuers and in-
vestors. Investors must spend time sifting through nonfinancial tax
disclosures in order to identify which of the disclosed consequences
are applicable to them. Issuers must pay lawyers and other tax pro-
fessionals to draft the disclosures and distribute the information to
the public.95
Drafting costs are likely not extravagant when the disclosure uses
boilerplate language. But this assumption cannot stand in the con-
text of corporate transactions, exchange offers, certain distributions
or issuances of preferred stock, convertible debt, or structured de-
rivative instruments. Investors’ tax calculations in such cases can be
very complicated, depending on the structure of a corporate trans-
action or the offered security. The process of developing the tax
disclosures is long and tedious—initial information gathering, col-
lecting required documents from the company, analyzing
applicable tax provisions, and, finally, drafting a disclosure deliver-
ing relevant information to investors.96
94. See infra note 138. See also Forward Pharma A/S, Registration Statement Under the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1933 (Form F-1) 157 (Aug. 8, 2014) (“In addition, [this docu-
ment] does not describe all of the tax consequences that may be relevant in light of a U.S.
Holder’s particular circumstances, including alternative minimum tax consequences . . . .”);
AR Capital Acquisition Corp., Registration Statement Under the Securities and Exchange Act
of 1933 (Form S-1) 110 (“This discussion does not address . . . taxpayers subject to the alter-
native minimum tax provisions of the Code.”).
95. Manuel Utset separates out the shares, bonds, notes, etc. being made available to the
public into two categories, in which lawyers spend a significant amount of time, the design
and production of the product, and the “information bundle” that goes alongside the prod-
uct. Manuel A. Utset, Producing Information: Initial Public Offerings, Production Costs, and the
Producing Lawyer, 74 OR. L. REV. 275, 299–300 (1995).
96. Id. at 301–03.
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In many cases, disclosure costs represent justifiable expenses, as
they are the least costly method of disseminating necessary informa-
tion to the market.97 However, in the tax context, where opinions
and disclosures contain little relevant information for investors, the
benefit to investors does not justify the issuer’s transaction costs.
3. The Practice Depletes Valuable Administrative Resources
The SEC spends valuable resources enforcing securities regula-
tions in the United States. The magnitude of the task is enormous,
and the thinly-staffed SEC must prioritize its tasks. Chairman White
has stressed that the Dodd-Frank Act’s increased regulatory man-
dates and the resulting rules are stretching the agency’s already
meager staff and budget.98 The SEC petitioned Congress for a
twenty-seven percent increase in its budget in the coming fiscal year
and requested an additional 676 full-time staff, a fifteen percent
increase.99 131 of these new staff positions would go to the enforce-
ment section.100
The SEC staff expends a great deal of time and resources ensur-
ing compliance with regulatory requirements applicable to
nonfinancial tax disclosures.101 Using valuable resources to enforce
a regulatory regime that does not support its intended purpose is
socially wasteful. It also potentially diverts valuable administrative
resources away from more necessary, and presumably more useful,
enforcement functions.
II. THE “AVERAGE TAXPAYER” IS NOT A DEFENSIBLE CONSTRUCT
To start remedying the regulatory failure identified in Part I, it is
necessary to uncover its roots. Part II discusses the failure of the
market’s practical solution to draft nonfinancial tax disclosures for
the benefit of a “reasonable investor” who is also an “average tax-
payer.” This Part demonstrates that the “average taxpayer” concept
97. See supra Part I.D.1., for an illustration of the rationale behind disclosure as support-
ing market efficiency.
98. John Olson & Gregg Wirth, SEC Chairman White Asks Congress to Pony Up Cash for the
SEC, 17 No. 6 WALLSTREETLAWYER.COM: SEC. ELEC. AGE 3 (June 2013).
99. Peter Feltman, SEC Hopes for Big Budget Increase, Congress Skeptical, CQ ROLL CALL
2013 WL 72099192 (May 16, 2013).
100. Id.
101. A review of EDGAR revealed sixty-three comment letters, written by the SEC to issu-
ers in the first six months of 2013 alone, addressing possible issues with nonfinancial tax
disclosure. On file with author.
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is not defensible. Financial models explaining the connection be-
tween asset prices and investor-level taxes further discredit the
“average taxpayer” as a viable legal construct, and courts routinely
reject it. Part II concludes that the U.S. regulatory system should
dispose of this concept.
A. The Conceptual Failure: There Cannot be an “Average Taxpayer”
One requirement for efficient market operation is that all mar-
ket participants must “agree on the implications of current
information for the current price and distributions of future prices
of each security.”102 In the context of investor-level taxes, it is not
obvious that such a condition could be met. As explained below,
different investors face different tax costs from investing in identi-
cal securities. Thus, everything else being equal, it is unreasonable
to assume that two reasonable investors with different tax positions
would assign the same net-value to a publicly-traded asset. A couple
of examples best illustrate this point:
Example 1. Assume that FCo. is a publicly-traded foreign corpora-
tion. FCo.’s stock is traded on the public market for $100. On Day
1, FCo. announces that on Day 2 it will distribute a dividend in the
sum of $20 per share to shareholders of record on Day 2.
Ignoring taxes for the moment, once the distribution is made,
the stock is expected to drop in value to $80 ($100 minus the $20
cash dividend distributed out of FCo.’s current assets). Post distri-
bution, any shareholder who held a $100 stock at distribution will
hold a stock valued at $80 and cash proceeds of $20, for a total net
value of $100. Thus, prior to the dividend distribution, the value of
the stock is not expected to change, as long as tax consequences are
ignored.
Taxes change this outcome. Most tax systems in the world impose
withholding taxes on dividends paid to foreign residents. Assume
that the jurisdiction in which FCo. is domiciled imposes withhold-
ing taxes at a rate of twenty-five percent. The withholding tax on a
$20 dividend distribution is thus $5. Post distribution, any “foreign”
shareholder (i.e., shareholder who does not reside in FCo.’s juris-
diction) will have at hand a stock valued at $80, but only $15 net,
after-tax cash proceeds, for a total net value of $95.
Assume that TE is a U.S. taxpayer, who is tax-exempt for U.S. tax
purposes, and is also a “reasonable investor.” TE holds the stock of
FCo. on Day 1. Immediately after FCo.’s dividend announcement
102. See Fama, supra note 19, at 387.
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(i.e. prior to the distribution), TE is approached by NE, another
U.S. taxpayer, who is a reasonable individual but not tax-exempt.
NE offers to buy TE’s stock for $95. As explained above, because
foreign withholding taxes are expected to be detrimental to the
stock value to the extent of the tax imposed (i.e., $5), TE agrees.
Now consider the tax picture from NE’s point of view. Under the
IRC, certain U.S. taxpayers are entitled to receive credit against for-
eign taxes paid and use such credit against their U.S. income tax
liability.103 NE—being a taxable investor—has U.S. income tax lia-
bility from various sources. NE, therefore, expects to use any tax
credit the U.S. government offered to reduce its U.S. tax liability
dollar-to-dollar. TE, on the other hand, as a tax-exempt taxpayer,
does not have any U.S. taxable income against which to apply a
foreign tax credit. For TE, the foreign tax credit is meaningless.
From NE’s point of view, the value of the stock should remain
unchanged: $100 (notwithstanding that NE was able to buy the
stock for only $95). After the distribution, NE expects to hold a
stock valued at $80, plus gross proceeds of $20. Like in the case of
TE, the foreign jurisdiction imposes withholding taxes on NE of $5,
so the net cash proceeds for NE are also $15. Unlike TE, however,
NE is granted $5 foreign tax credit for the foreign withholding
taxes, which NE can use to shield NE’s U.S. taxes. The credit offsets
the withholding taxes. The total value of the stock to NE is thus
$100. NE is able to make an arbitrage gain of $5 due to its particu-
lar tax position, which is different from TE’s tax position.
NE could potentially monetize the arbitrage in the following
manner: once the distribution is made, the stock price falls to $80
as explained above. NE could then turn and sell the FCo. stock
back to TE for the market price of $80. Since TE bought back the
stock for $15 less than it sold the stock pre-distribution, TE is com-
pensated for the loss of the $15 net distribution (NE received the
distribution as the shareholder on record at the time of the
distribution).
NE, on the other hand, bought the stock for $95, sold it for $80
(for a loss of $15), but received dividend distribution valued at $20
($15 net distribution plus $5 foreign tax credit). The U.S. Treasury
essentially financed a $5 economic gain for NE through the foreign
tax credit.104
103. See I.R.C. § 901.
104. Note that the loss from the sale of the stock offsets any possible U.S. taxable income
on the distribution NE received.
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These facts are not hypothetical. They are a simplified version of
the transaction described in the seminal case, Compaq v. Commis-
sioner, where Compaq and a tax-exempt investor engaged in a
transaction of the sort described above.105 This transaction was
made possible because the two investors valued the stock differently
due to their individual tax positions. Congress has now amended
the IRC to prevent such perceived abuse.106 The example is illus-
trated in Table 1.
TABLE 1: STOCK VALUES FOR TE AND NE AFTER DIVIDEND
ANNOUNCEMENT, AS AFFECTED BY THEIR
INDIVIDUAL TAX POSITIONS
 TE (tax exempt) NE (taxable) 
Trading value (before dividend) $100 $100 
Gross dividend expected to be received by 
the shareholder 
$20 $20 
Expected effect of the distribution on 
stock value -$20 -$20 
Foreign withholding taxes expected to be 
imposed on the dividend (25%) 
-$5 -$5 
Foreign tax credit (on account of 
withholding taxes) n/a
107 $5 
Economic value $95 $100 
Example 2. A more complex example produces even more dra-
matic differences in investors’ interpretation of tax information.
This example will reappear throughout the rest of the Article. As-
sume that Divicorp is a foreign corporation for tax purposes and
that its common stock is publicly traded on the New York Stock
Exchange. On Day 0, Divicorp’s stock is traded at $100 per share.
That same day, Divicorp announces its intention to distribute, on
Day 2, a dividend in the amount of $10 per share to shareholders
on record as of Day 1.
105. Compaq Computer Corp. and Subsidiaries v. C.I.R., 277 F.3d 778, 780–83 (5th Cir.
2001). For a thorough discussion on how taxes created price variations in the Compaq case,
see generally Michael Knoll, Compaq Redux: Implicit Taxes and the Question of Pre-Tax Profit, 26
VA. TAX REV. 821 (2007).
106. I.R.C. § 901(k)(1) (disallowing the use of a foreign tax credit on withholding taxes
paid by a foreign corporation the stock of which is held by the recipient of the dividend for
certain minimum periods).
107. The foreign tax credit is only useful to taxpayers with taxable income. As such, the
foreign tax credit is irrelevant to TE, who is tax exempt.
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On Day 0, FC, a foreign corporate-investor (who is assumed to be
a “reasonable investor” residing in a jurisdiction other than
Divicorp’s jurisdiction), considers buying a substantial portion of
Divicorp’s stock. If it buys the stock before Day 1, it will be a share-
holder on Day 1, entitled to receive the dividend to be distributed
on Day 2.
Assume that the dividend is subject to a twenty percent withhold-
ing tax in Divicorp’s home jurisdiction. FC knows that upon the
distribution of the dividends, the value of the Divicorp stock is ex-
pected to decrease by the gross amount of the distribution.
Upon distribution, FC will have on hand a stock valued at $90,
and a gross dividend distribution of $10, for a total gross value of
$100. However, FC will bear the burden of withholding taxes im-
posed on the dividend. After the twenty percent withholding tax is
imposed on the $10 distribution, FC will be left with an $8 net dis-
tribution on hand. FC thus values the stock at $98 ($90 share value
post distribution plus $8 net distribution). In other words, FC—as a
reasonable investor—interpreted the information about the forth-
coming dividend distribution as detrimental to the stock’s value ($2
net decrease to share value).108
Assume that FC is not further taxed in its home country on distri-
butions from foreign corporations. This is reasonable since many
jurisdictions largely exempt dividends received from foreign corpo-
rations from taxation.
DC is another corporate investor assumed to be a “reasonable
investor.” It also considers purchasing a sizable stake in Divicorp on
Day 0. Unlike FC, however, DC is a domestic U.S. corporation. Like
FC, DC will bear the burden of the twenty percent withholding tax
in Divicorp’s jurisdiction. However, as explained in the previous ex-
ample, DC will also be entitled to a corresponding foreign tax
credit from the U.S. government, which means that DC is generally
indifferent to withholding taxes. Foreign residents, like FC, are gen-
erally not entitled to receive foreign tax credits from the U.S.
government.
At this point, this example diverges from the previous example.
Unlike many other jurisdictions in the world, the United States
taxes distributions from foreign corporations. Assume that DC is
subject to a twenty percent U.S. corporate tax rate on its income
108. For simplicity, it is assumed that no income tax treaty applies. In reality, income tax
treaties will reduce withholding rates on dividends. For U.S. treaties withholding rate on
dividends is generally between five percent and fifteen percent. See United States Model In-
come Tax Convention, 1996, 1 Tax Treaties (CCH) art. 10.1(b), (Nov. 15, 2006), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-trty/model006.pdf.
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(including income from foreign dividends). At the same time, DC
expects the dividend distribution to carry with it an additional
favorable tax attribute: a foreign deemed-paid tax credit.
This calls for some explanation. Under the IRC, upon the distri-
bution of dividends by foreign corporations, certain domestic
corporate shareholders (like DC) may receive credit, not only for
withholding taxes the foreign jurisdiction imposed, but also for for-
eign income taxes that the distributing corporation paid on the income
from which the distribution is made.109 Under section 902 of the
IRC, the amount of the net distribution is grossed up by the
amount of any foreign income taxes the distributing corporation
paid. A tax credit is then given to the domestic corporate investor
for those taxes. Essentially, any income from which the distribution
is made (i.e., income the distributing corporation earned) is
treated as if the corporate-shareholder receiving the distribution
earned it directly. Any foreign income tax that the distributing cor-
poration paid is deemed paid by the receiving shareholder (the
grossed-up amount thus equals the amount distributed plus any cor-
porate income taxes that the issuer paid on the corporate earnings
from which the distribution is made). The deemed-paid credit is
not available to foreign taxpayers like FC.
Assume that Divicorp was previously subject to a 33.3% corporate
income tax rate in its home jurisdiction. Therefore, the distribution
of $10 to DC is grossed up by the amount of taxes previously paid
by Divicorp on the income underlying the distribution. The grossed
up amount is calculated as follows: [(net distribution) / (1-t)], or
$10 / 1 minus 0.33 = $15.
In other words, Divicorp had $15 gross corporate income in the
foreign jurisdiction. That income was subject to a 33.3% corporate
income tax in its own jurisdiction, generating a $5 tax liability to
Divicorp, leaving $10 net income available for distribution. After
grossing up, DC is deemed to receive—for United States federal in-
come tax purposes—$15 of dividends (even though it only got $10
gross distribution).110
With the twenty percent U.S. corporate income tax on a deemed
distribution of $15, DC is subject to a $3 tax in the U.S. However,
the distribution carries with it a deemed-paid tax credit in the
amount of $5 (the corporate income taxes actually paid by Divicorp
109. See I.R.C. § 902. Only corporate shareholders who hold at least ten percent of the
voting stock of a foreign corporation are entitled to deemed-paid credit. See id. Such share-
holders must also meet certain holding period requirements to be eligible for the deemed-
paid credit. See id.
110. The net distribution is “grossed up” by adding back the $5 corporate tax paid in the
foreign jurisdiction.
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in the foreign jurisdiction), which DC can use to offset its taxable
income from other sources.
After the dust settles, DC expects to have at hand a stock valued
at $90 (the stock value is decreased by the amount of actual gross
distribution, or $10) and a $10 gross distribution. A corresponding
direct credit from the U.S. government (the same as in Example 1)
will economically offset any withholding taxes imposed in the for-
eign jurisdiction ($2). In addition, DC will have a U.S. tax liability
of $3 on the grossed-up distribution (twenty percent of $15) and
will receive $5 of deemed-paid credit, for a net share value of $102.
Thus, DC interprets the information about the forthcoming divi-
dend distribution to be favorable (increasing the stock value by $2)
and is, therefore, willing to pay more than current market price.
Table 2 illustrates this example.
TABLE 2: STOCK VALUES AFTER DIVIDEND ANNOUNCEMENT, AS
AFFECTED BY FC AND DC’S PARTICULAR TAX POSITIONS
 FC (foreign) DC (domestic) 
Trading value (before dividend) $100 $100 
Gross dividend expected to be received by the 
shareholder (for foreign tax purposes) $10 $10 
Expected effect of the distribution on stock value -$10 -$10 
Foreign withholding taxes expected to be imposed 
on the dividend (20%) -$2 -$2 
Direct foreign tax credit granted by the U.S. (for 
withholding tax) 
n/a111 $2 
U.S. income tax on grossed-up distribution (20 % 
on $15)  n/a -$3
112 
Deemed paid foreign tax credit granted by the 
U.S. (for foreign corporate taxes paid by Divicorp) 
n/a $5113 
Economic value $98 $102 
Both FC and DC are reasonable investors and wish to maximize
their net profits. They both consider their after-tax returns. How-
ever, as demonstrated, both interpreted the same piece of
information differently due to their own tax status. FC viewed the
111. The foreign tax credit is generally only granted to U.S. taxpayers. Therefore, the
foreign tax credit is irrelevant to FC who is a foreign taxpayer.
112. The twenty percent U.S. tax rate is applied against deemed dividend income of $15
(and not $10). The gross amount is calculated by (net distribution) / (1-t). In this case $10/
1-0.33 = $15.
113. The $5 corporate income tax Divicorp paid in the foreign jurisdiction is deemed
paid by DC, which entitles DC to a credit.
28 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 48:1
forthcoming dividend distribution as detrimental to the stock price
while DC interpreted it favorably.
The examples discussed above show that ECMH’s assumption—
that all investors interpret all information similarly—is highly ques-
tionable in the tax context. There is no “class” of average taxpayers
who interpret tax-related information similarly. Importantly, the
ECMH acknowledges that there may be inconsistencies in the inter-
pretation of market information.114 However, the ECMH suggests
that markets will nevertheless remain efficient, as long as interpreta-
tion gaps are relatively rare, and no single class of investors is
consistently better informed or better positioned to interpret mar-
ket information.115 This remedial mechanism is inapplicable in the
case of investor-level taxes. As long as FC is a foreign corporate tax-
payer and DC is a domestic corporate taxpayer, they will remain
inconsistent in their interpretation of tax-related information. In
fact, it is difficult to imagine any pair of investors whose tax posi-
tions and consequences are identical. It is therefore unreasonable
to accept the idea that an “average” tax preference exists.
B. The Preferences of “Average Taxpayers” Do Not
Affect Market Efficiency
The examples in Subpart II.A demonstrate that taxpayers inter-
pret nonfinancial tax information differently. Market prices,
however, are eventually set. Investment decisions are made. If mar-
ket participants are “reasonable,” they will take into account tax
costs. Whose tax preferences actually matter, then? Financial litera-
ture suggests that the significant tax preferences are not those of
“average taxpayers.”
Economic, finance, and accounting scholars have extensively
studied the effect of investor-level taxes on the price of publicly-
traded assets.116 Multiple studies have attempted to model the effect
of heterogeneous tax preferences on market prices and to use em-
pirical research to support such models. Unfortunately, such
literature appears to have had little effect on the regulatory frame-
work. This Subpart seeks to highlight the impact such studies could
have on the regulatory structure governing nonfinancial tax
disclosure.
114. See Fama, supra note 19, at 383.
115. Id.
116. Michelle Hanlon & Shane Heitzman, A Review of Tax Research, 50 J. ACCOUNTING. &
ECON. 127, 160–68 (2010).
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1. The Irrelevance View
The irrelevance view suggests that taxes are irrelevant for pricing
publicly-traded assets. According to this theory, nontaxable actors,
such as pension funds and educational institutions’ investment
funds, set market prices.117 These institutional investors are fre-
quent traders, are always in a better arbitrage position118 than
taxable investors, and, therefore, always set market price. Tax-ex-
empt investors are willing to pay more than other investors for the
same risk-adjusted (but not tax-adjusted) returns because they do
not expect to incur any investor-level tax burdens.
Assuming the purpose of nonfinancial tax disclosures is to sup-
port accurate market pricing, there is little justification for
nonfinancial tax disclosures if tax-exempt investors set market
prices. In this case, tax consequences are simply an irrelevant piece
of information. More importantly, tax-exempt investors are not “av-
erage taxpayers.” The “average taxpayer” is assumed to be a taxable
investor.119 Indeed, tax-exempt institutions are specifically carved
out from the scope of nonfinancial tax disclosures.120
2. Marginal Investors and Clientele Effects
In recent years, the irrelevance view has lost traction.121 Multiple
studies have found that investor-level taxes affect asset prices and
have suggested various models to explain the mechanism of tax
capitalization and its effects on asset pricing.122
117. See generally, e.g., Fischer Black & Myron Scholes, The Effects of Dividend Yield & Divi-
dend Policy on Common Stock Prices and Returns, 1 J. FIN. ECON. 1, 1 (1974) (finding no evidence
that expected returns on high yield common stocks differ from the expected returns on low
yield common stocks either before or after taxes); Merton H. Miller & Myron S. Scholes,
Dividends and Taxes: Some Empirical Evidence, 90 J. POL. ECON. 1118, 1130–31 (1982) (criticiz-
ing empirical studies that show evidence of the effects of dividend taxes on market prices,
concluding it is not convincing); Gene Amromin, Paul Harrison & Steven Sharpe, How Did
the 2003 Dividend Tax Cut Affect Stock Prices?, (Fed. Reserve Bd., Working Paper 2005-61, 2006)
(finding no overall statistically significant effect of the 2003 dividend tax cut on stock prices).
118. “Arbitrage position” means the ability to take advantage of a pricing differential be-
tween two similar assets (in terms of risk adjusted return) not available to other investors.
119. See N.Y. BAR REPORT, supra note 14, at 2–3 (noting tax exempt investors as one cate-
gory of “non-average” investors).
120. See discussion supra note 56 and accompanying text.
121. Hanlon & Heitzman, supra note 116, at 164 (“There is growing evidence that the
irrelevance view does not hold and that taxes matter in pricing stocks.”).
122. See id. at 160–61 (2010), for a recent of summary of mechanisms of dividend tax
capitalization. For a recent of summary of mechanisms of capital-gains tax capitalization, see
generally Zhonglan Dai et al., Capital Gains Taxes and Asset Prices: Capitalization or Lock-in?, 63
J. FIN. 709 (2008).
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One body of studies suggests that a single, identifiable marginal
investor, whose tax preferences determine the rate at which taxes
are capitalized, sets the market price.123 Marginal investors are fre-
quent traders (such as dealers in securities and other financial
institutions) who are indifferent between purchasing two securities
with similar risk profiles that are taxed differently.124 In such a case,
the tax profile of an asset is the marginal consideration in the in-
vestment decision.
Under such a view, issuers could rewrite investor-level tax disclo-
sures to target marginal investors, but only if they could identify the
marginal investors. Financial literature has yet to provide conclusive
evidence of the identity of marginal investors as a “class.”125 Moreo-
ver, the identity of the marginal investor can theoretically vary for
different trades. This implies that investor-level taxes are detrimen-
tal to market equilibrium because they facilitate arbitrage
opportunities.126
Returning to Example 2, with FC and DC, in Subpart II.A: in the
absence of taxes, DC may be indifferent between purchasing
Divicorp stock, and the stock of another corporation, Eurocorp, op-
erating in the same industry segment as Divicorp. Assume that
Eurocorp’s stock is also valued at $100 per share as of Day 0, and
that Eurocorp also intends to distribute a $10 dividend. If
Eurocorp, however, did not previously pay corporate tax in a for-
eign jurisdiction, no deemed-paid foreign tax credit is expected to
flow to DC with the distribution. If both shares are offered on the
market for their current price of $100, DC would prefer Divicorp’s
stock over Eurocorp’s solely because of the different tax profiles. As
explained, DC would pay as much as $102 for Divicorp’s stock. Any
123. For a summary of the potential role of marginal investors in tax capitalization, see
Douglas A. Shackelford & Terry Shevlin, Empirical Tax Research In Accounting, 31 J. ACCT. &
ECONS. 321, 349–50 (2001).
124. SCHOLES ET AL., supra note 6, at 130. For example, an investor subject to a thirty
percent tax rate is indifferent between purchasing a taxable security that is expected to gen-
erate a ten percent pre-tax risk-adjusted return (meaning, that the after-tax net return, after a
thirty percent tax, will be seven percent) or a tax-exempt security expected to generate a
seven percent non-taxable risk-adjusted return.
125. See Hanlon & Heitzman, supra note 116, at 129–30 (discussing the elusive identity of
the marginal investor). Different studies have identified different classes of investors as “mar-
ginal investors.” Compare, e.g., Leonie Bell & Tim Jenkinson, New Evidence of the Impact of
Dividend Taxation and on the Identity of the Marginal Investor, 57 J. FIN. 1321, 1341 (2002) (argu-
ing that pension funds are the marginal investors), with Douglas J. Lamdin & Craig Hiemstra,
Ex-Dividend Day Share Price Behavior: Effects of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 75 REV. ECONS. &
STATS. 778 (1993) (arguing that the marginal investors are short-term traders). Most scholars
agree, however, that marginal investors are institutional investors.
126. See Hanlon & Heitzman, supra note 116, at 165.
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lower price would be a bargain. Thus, DC will be the marginal in-
vestor setting Divicorp’s stock price because it is willing to pay more
than other investors, and the seller will sell to the highest bidder.
If the marginal investor view is accepted, investor-level tax disclo-
sure is not a practical endeavor. The identity of the marginal
investor is dynamic, and different tax information is relevant at dif-
ferent times, depending on the particular identity and tax status of
the marginal investor in any given trade. This makes the practicabil-
ity of disclosure questionable. Either all information must be
disclosed in advance (which, as explained in Part I, is impossible),
or tax disclosures should be dynamic and change as the identity of
the marginal investor changes.
Even setting aside practical difficulties, however, financial litera-
ture makes it clear that “marginal investors” are not “average
taxpayers.” They are financial institutions, which are usually subject
to various specific tax regimes.127 In tax disclosure practice, such
investors are not regarded as “average taxpayers.”128
While the marginal investor approach explains how individual
investors determine market prices, it is unlikely that many investors
are marginal investors in practice. It is unreasonable to expect that
many investors could consistently find “a pair of securities with
identical risk that vary only on the tax treatment of the returns.”129
Investors, who are not the marginal investors, would nonetheless
favor investments that are expected to maximize their after-tax re-
turn.130 The resulting tax-induced capital allocation is known as the
Tax Clientele Effect.131
For example, under the clientele approach, tax-exempt investors
are expected to invest in dividend-paying firms, where they enjoy a
current and steady stream of untaxed cash.132 Conversely, taxable
investors prefer to defer taxation as long as possible and tend to
invest in growth companies, which seldom distribute taxable divi-
dends. Taxable investors eventually pay taxes upon disposition of
the security at preferential long-term capital gain rates. Thus, based
127. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
128. See N.Y. BAR REPORT supra note 14, at 3 n.4.
129. Hanlon & Heitzman, supra note 116, at 165 (emphasis added).
130. SCHOLES ET AL., supra note 6, at 130.
131. For a discussion of various types of Tax Clientele Effects and their potential effects
on asset pricing, see generally Philip H. Dybvig & Stephen A. Ross, Tax Clienteles and Asset
Pricing, 41 J. FIN. 751 (1986); see also Yair Listokin, Taxation and Liquidity, 120 YALE L.J. 1682,
1720–22 (2011) (examining the effect of income taxes on the premium paid for illiquid
assets, creating a shift based on how the tax distorts the clienteles’ tax preferences).
132. SCHOLES ET AL., supra note 6, at 130.
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on the nature of the company’s distribution policies, different com-
panies often have different tax clienteles.133
Looking back at the FC, DC, Divicorp, and Eurocorp example,
domestic investors who have use of foreign tax credits—like DC—
are attracted to Divicorp’s stock. As shown in Table 2, supra, after
the initial arbitrage opportunities resulting from the dividend an-
nouncement are exploited, Divicorp’s share price is expected to
stabilize at $102 per share. It is also expected that all new Divicorp
investors are domestic corporate taxpayers. Foreign corporate in-
vestors like FC are attracted to Eurocorp’s stock, the price of which
is expected to stabilize at $98.
Investor-level tax disclosure could make theoretical sense if issu-
ing entities “know” who their tax clienteles are and regulators apply
different disclosure requirements to each issuing entity, based on
the entity’s tax clientele. Whether this is a practical approach is un-
clear. Not only would issuers have to draft multiple different
disclosures, but each issuer’s tax clientele can change over time,
making disclosures become outdated. More importantly, however,
tax clientele literature strongly advices against the use of the “aver-
age taxpayer” concept as a linchpin for nonfinancial tax disclosure.
If the Clientele Effect is real, then a class of “average taxpayers”
does not exist. The Clientele Effect supports the view that different
classes of taxpayers affect the prices of different securities. The mar-
ket environment is, therefore, dotted with multiple classes of
“average” taxpayers.
3. Portfolio Basis Approach
Finally, another group of studies suggests that market equilib-
rium is achieved because investors price assets on a portfolio basis
(rather than a single asset basis).134 This approach assumes that
each investor aggregates various tax consequences resulting from
133. See Edwin J. Elton & Martin J. Gruber, Marginal Stockholder Tax Rates and the Clientele
Effect, 52 REV. ECON. STAT. 68, 72–74 (1970) (finding clientele effects based on a company’s
dividend policy, particularly for corporations because of the deduction, rather than tax-ex-
empt institutions); see also Franklin Allen et al., A Theory of Dividends Based on Tax Clienteles, 55
J. FIN. 2499, 2501 (2000) (asserting that high-dividend policy will attract more institutional
investor clienteles and send a signal of a “quality” firm and management); Robert H.
Litzenberger & Krishna Ramaswamy, The Effect of Personal Taxes and Dividends on Capital Asset
Prices, 7 J. FIN. ECON. 163, 192 (1979) (finding evidence of a clientele effect for stockholders
in higher tax brackets choosing stocks with lower dividend yields).
134. See generally, e.g., M. J. Brennan, Taxes, Market Valuation And Corporate Financial Policy,
23 NAT’L TAX J. 417 (1970) (developing an after-tax Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM));
Roger H. Gordon & David F. Bradford, Taxation and the Stock Market Valuation of Capital Gains
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investment in securities with different tax profiles into the pricing
of all securities in the portfolio. If true, then nonfinancial tax dis-
closures must theoretically describe all relevant tax information to
all investors. Thus, different investors can aggregate the tax infor-
mation from different issuers to construct their desired “tax
portfolio.” It seems that regulations currently ask issuers to do this.
Part I already discussed the impossibility of meaningful compliance
with such a requirement.135
More importantly, under a portfolio basis approach, the tax pref-
erences of “[i]nvestors with the greatest wealth and least risk
aversion” are expected to affect market prices.136 Such investors are,
by definition, not “average investors.” Investors that hold the largest
portfolios and are not risk-averse are usually institutional inves-
tors137 or otherwise extremely wealthy investors that are specifically
excluded from the scope of nonfinancial tax disclosures.138
It is difficult to summarize financial literature on investor-level
taxes and their effects on investment behavior. Financial models
and empirical studies have yet to produce conclusive results about
the identity of investors whose tax preferences actually affect mar-
ket prices. The studies, however, are very telling because there is
one type of investor whose preferences likely matter very little (if at
all): the “average taxpayers.” They are largely irrelevant in the oper-
ation of capital markets, so it makes little sense to draft tax
disclosures solely for the benefit of such taxpayers.
The only relatively safe bet stemming from the financial litera-
ture is that the tax preferences of institutional investors or other
and Dividends: Theory and Empirical Results, 14 J. PUB. ECON. 109 (1980) (showing that divi-
dends do not affect pricing differently from capital gains, which implies that the relative
valuation is an aggregate consequence of portfolio choices).
135. See discussion supra Part I.B.
136. Hanlon & Heitzman, supra note 116, at 165.
137. Due to institutional investors’ diversification and increased risk-aversion, some stud-
ies have shown their ownership to be synonymous with volatility in the stock price of a firm
(since institutional investors can benefit from such volatility). Richard W. Sias, Volatility and
the Institutional Investor, 52 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 13, 13–14 (1996); see also Ryan T. Ball, Does Antici-
pated Information Impose a Cost on Risk-Averse Investors? A Test of the Hirshleifer Effect, 51 J.
ACCOUNTING RESEARCH 31, 55 (2013) (using institutional investor ownership as a proxy to
explain volatility in a firm’s stock price).
138. While nonfinancial tax disclosure sections do not explicitly exclude high net-worth
individuals from the scope of the disclosure, all such disclosure sections exclude taxpayers
that are subject to Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT). Recent data suggests that AMT applied
to the top 4.2 percent of taxpayers in 2013. Aggregate AMT Projections, 2012–2023, Table T13-
0209, Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center Microsimulation Model (Aug. 26, 2013), available
at http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/numbers/Content/PDF/T13-0209.pdf. Thus, most (if
not all) high net worth individuals are subject to AMT, and, as such, excluded from the scope
of the disclosure.
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wealthy investors are the ones that affect market prices. Institu-
tional investors are regularly excluded from the scope of
nonfinancial tax disclosures. Current nonfinancial tax disclosure
practice thus excludes investors that matter and includes investors
that do not (i.e., “average taxpayers”).
C. Courts’ Adjudication and the “Average Taxpayer”
This Subpart shows that court decisions dealing with nonfinan-
cial tax disclosures also support the conclusion that the concept of
the “average taxpayer” is questionable.
Court decisions addressing alleged misstatement or omission of
facts in nonfinancial tax disclosures are rare.139 This is not surpris-
ing: given the numerous carve-outs in nonfinancial tax disclosures,
very few investors have something upon which to act, even if they
feel misled. In the few cases on point, courts have generally found
that an investor’s individual tax outcome from securities transac-
tions is not actionable. These courts have concluded that
“discussions of the personal tax ramifications of proposed corpo-
rate transactions are beyond the scope of the securities laws.”140
Courts distinguish tax consequences that depend solely on the stake-
holder’s tax consequences from tax consequences that “flow
directly from the corporate transaction itself,” making only the lat-
ter actionable.141
139. This Subpart only addresses litigation outside the context of tax shelters. In tax shel-
ter offerings, the securities are offered primarily for the tax benefits associated with them,
and investors sue when such benefits do not materialize. The assumption is that securities
tailored to create a specific tax benefit will only attract investors that, considering their per-
sonal tax position, would to be able to take advantage of the benefits suggested. Such
investors could not be regarded as “average taxpayers.” For a discussion on the tax shelter
industry as well the responses of Congress and the IRS. See, e.g., Martin A. Chirelstein &
Lawrence A. Zelenak, Tax Shelters and the Search for a Silver Bullet 105 Colum. L. Rev. 1939
(2005). The brief survey therein assumes that taxes are simply another cost of investment
(not the reason for investment) that one must account for.
140. See Minzer v. Keegan, No. 97-CV-4077, 1999 WL 33972459, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 25,
1999), aff’d, 218 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 2000); see also Lewis v. Oppenheimer & Co., 481 F. Supp.
1199, 1206 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (“The income tax situation of each stockholder is personal busi-
ness, and absent injury to the corporation, is irrelevant to damage claims under the federal
securities laws.”).
141. See Mendell v. Greenberg, 927 F.2d 667, 676 (2d Cir. 1990) (“Expanding the require-
ments of SEC Rule 14a–9 to insist upon disclosure of incidental tax benefits—benefits that
do not flow directly from the corporate transaction itself but rather from the individual
shareholder’s personal tax situation—goes beyond the purposes of the Rule.”), amended by
938 F.2d 1528 (2d Cir. 1990); see also Shaev v. Hampel, No. 99 Civ. 10578(RMB), 2002 WL
31413805, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2002), aff’d, 74 F. Appx. 154 (2003).
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The distinctions between tax consequences that do or do not
“flow through directly” from a transaction usually arise in litigation
brought under SEC Rule 14a-9, relating to alleged insiders’ benefits
from proposed transactions.142 Rule 14a-9 prohibits proxy solicita-
tions from being “false or misleading with respect to any material
fact, or which omits to state any material fact.”143 Management and
other insiders’ interests in a transaction or plan for which share-
holder votes are solicited could be material to an investor weighing
its vote and thus should be disclosed.144 Insider interests may also
include tax benefits that may result from the transaction, and in
certain circumstances the issuer must explicitly disclose those bene-
fits.145 Shareholders sometimes allege that proxy statements failed
to accurately describe insiders’ anticipated tax consequences and
that an accurate statement would have exposed a tax-interest con-
flict between insiders and other shareholders.
For example, in Mendell v. Greenberg, a shareholder sued several
corporate insiders in connection with a proxy statement soliciting
votes to approve a proposed merger.146 The plaintiff argued that
the proxy statement failed to disclose certain incidental tax benefits
controlling shareholders expected to receive from the transac-
tion.147 In denying the claim, the Second Circuit reasoned that
since personal tax benefits are speculative in nature, a requirement
to disclose them is more likely to confuse than to inform.148 The
court noted that “the practical difficulties involved in computing
speculative personal tax consequences—especially since those con-
sequences depend upon indeterminate, often difficult to predict
variables—precludes any requirement that potential incidental tax
benefits need be disclosed.”149
142. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9.
143. Id.
144. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (outlining the information to be disclosed in connection
with proxy solicitations). For example, Item 7 outlines the information required in the proxy
relating to any action for the election of directors or executive officers while Item 8 directs
disclosure of information relating to the compensation of directors and executive officers. Id.
145. In the case of compensation plan involving options in the registrant, Schedule 14A
requires the disclosure of “the federal income tax consequences of the issuance and exercise
of such options to the recipient and the registrant.” 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101, Item 10.
146. 927 F.2d 667, 670–71 (2d Cir. 1990).
147. Id. at 671.
148. Id. at 677 (“Here [the Insider’s] failure to disclose the personal tax consequences
resulting to her from the merger were speculative in nature and may not be deemed a mate-
rial omission. To hold otherwise would require that major shareholders include speculative
predictions of their personal finances in a proxy statement that is more likely to confuse than
enlighten other stockholders.”).
149. Id. at 676.
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In Lewis v. Dansker, the plaintiff argued that that a proxy state-
ment failed to accurately account for the value of a proposed
transaction to insiders.150 Specifically, the disclosed value to insiders
did not account for insiders’ anticipated deductible losses resulting
from the transaction.151 Such deductible losses increased the trans-
action’s net value to insiders beyond the par value disclosed in the
proxy solicitation. The court rejected the argument and found that
“the usability of such losses will vary—not exclusively according to
the source of the deduction—but also according to the individual’s
other income, offsets to income, and tax bracket.”152 As such, any disclo-
sure was speculative in nature. Moreover, in questioning whether
such information would have been “material” to shareholders’
votes, the court suggested that incidental tax benefits to insiders is
an irrelevant piece of information to shareholders, as long as the
corporation’s interest is not harmed.153
In Freedman v. Barrow, a shareholder brought a derivative action
against a corporation in respect of proxy statements soliciting votes
regarding a compensation plan for the corporation’s employees.154
The plan included incentive compensation in the form of stock ap-
preciation rights (SARs). The plaintiff argued that the proxy
statement failed to accurately disclose the set of incentives and dis-
incentives to employees in exercising their rights under the plan.155
Specifically, the plaintiff suggested the proxy statement failed to ad-
equately describe the tax consequences to employees in exercising
the SARs.156 Rejecting the argument, the court reasoned that the
decision to exercise a stock option “necessarily depends on individ-
ual factors such as the employee’s own financial situation, his ability
and willingness to borrow, and his tax consequences.”157 Therefore,
any disclosure in this respect was not required as it would have
amounted to a “speculative assertion.”158
Another notable case is Zemel v. Philips.159 There, a plaintiff al-
leged that a proxy statement failed to disclose that a liquidation
plan was structured to achieve favorable tax outcomes to insiders.
In concluding that such information is not “material,” the court
150. 357 F. Supp. 636, 638–40 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
151. Id. at 640–41.
152. Id. at 643 (emphasis added).
153. See id. at 643.
154. 427 F. Supp. 1129, 1134–38 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
155. See id. at 1139–40.
156. Id. at 1143.
157. Id. at 1144.
158. Id.
159. Zemel Family Trust v. Philips Int’l Realty Corp., No. 00 Civ. 7438 MGC, 2000 WL
1772608 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2000).
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reasoned that “[the] plaintiff ha[d] provided no evidence that the
interests of the shareholders were compromised by the tax-efficient
outcome for [insiders], and so has failed to show that the alleged
non-disclosure was material.”160
This body of cases contradicts the existence of an average group
of taxpayers. If tax outcomes are a result of personal tax positions,
as courts have suggested, they are not “average.”161 Even tax bene-
fits to the “class” of insiders cannot count as “average” to that class
because not all insiders share the same tax preferences. Even if all
insiders receive tax benefits from the transaction, disclosure is not
necessarily required since insiders’ tax benefits do not necessarily
harm investors. These cases, however, do not address the issue of
“tax averageness” in the context of a direct tax detriment to stake-
holders resulting from inaccurate disclosures. Very few cases
address direct tax-related injuries to investors, but these cases also
show the legal irrelevance of the “average taxpayer” construct.
For example, in Minzer v. Keegan, shareholders of a target corpo-
ration brought action to recover damages resulting from a merger
of the target corporation with an acquirer.162 The plaintiffs alleged
that the proxy solicitation failed to adequately disclose that the tax
consequences from the merger were detrimental to shareholders,
compared to the tax consequences that would have resulted from a
different bid.163 Specifically, shareholders of the merged corpora-
tion were paid seventy-five percent in the acquiring corporation’s
stock and twenty-five percent in cash, with the cash portion being
immediately taxable to the shareholders.164 Another bidder, whose
bid the board rejected, proposed a full stock-for-stock merger, in
which shareholders of the target corporation would have received
160. Id. at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2000).
161. For additional cases making the distinction between personal tax consequences and
tax consequences that flow directly from the transaction in the context of proxy solicitation,
see Lewis v. Oppenheimer, 481 F. Supp. 1199, 1206–10 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); see also Shaev v. Ham-
pel, No. 99 Civ. 10578(RMB), 2002 WL 31413805, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2002)
(shareholders brought action against a corporation and its officers suggesting that in solicit-
ing a vote for the approval of a stock incentive plan failed to “‘disclose all the federal tax
consequences’ of granting an option, particularly the fact that ‘under the U.S. federal estate
tax, gift tax, and generation-skipping transfer tax, these stock options and SARs are treated as
taxable.’” The court rejected the argument since the described benefits are personal and do
not “flow directly” from the transaction). Id. at *6, aff’d, 74 F. Appx. 154 (2003); Seinfeld v.
Bartz, No. C01-2259 TEH, 2002 WL 243597, at *4–5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2002) (no material
omission in failure to disclose “all federal tax consequences” of an option plan), aff’d, 322
F.3d 693 (9th Cir. 2003).
162. Minzer v. Keegan, No. 97-CV-4077, 1999 WL 33972459, at *1–6 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 25,
1999), aff’d, 218 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 2000).
163. Id. at *5.
164. Id.
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only stock in the acquirer in return for their stock in the target.165 A
stock-for-stock exchange would have been tax-free for the share-
holders at the time of the transaction. Failing to disclose the
favorable tax consequences of the other bid allegedly resulted in a
direct tax injury to the shareholders.
The court rejected the argument for two reasons. First, on factual
grounds, the court stated that the disclosure did include the requi-
site description of the structural difference between the two
offers.166 Second, the court also added that because the “true value
of each bid depends on the tax situation of individual sharehold-
ers,”167 the other offer cannot necessarily be considered “materially
higher.”168 Thus, the court implicitly rejected the idea that personal
tax consequences resulting from corporate transactions are “aver-
age” to all shareholders.
In cases where courts granted shareholders a remedy for a tax-
related injury, relief was granted due to a misstatement relating to a
corporate-level piece of material information rather than the tax in-
jury itself. The corporate misstatement denied shareholders the
information required to calculate their own tax liabilities.
For example, in Herbst v. ITT, a merger was structured to achieve
tax-free treatment.169 In seeking a ruling from the IRS that the
merger was indeed tax-free, however, the corporation failed to dis-
close relevant information.170 A class plaintiff claimed that this
failure created a risk that the IRS would not respect the tax-free
treatment of the merger and that the corporation should have dis-
closed that risk in the proxy statement.171 In response, the
defendants argued, inter alia, that the plaintiff could not stand as a
class representative.172 They argued that if the merger is deemed
taxable, different investors might face different tax consequences,
depending on their personal tax positions.173
165. Id.
166. Id. at 11 (“In suggesting that the shareholders needed to be told that different trans-
action structures would result in different tax treatments, plaintiffs ignore the Supreme
Court’s admonishment that the purpose of the securities laws is to disclose, not to treat the
shareholders like ‘nitwits’ or to ‘attribute to investors a child-like simplicity.’” quoting Basic,
Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 234 (1988)).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Herbst v. Int’l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 495 F.2d 1308, 1310–11 (2d Cir. 1974).
170. Id. at 1316.
171. Id. at 1314 (“Herbst claims that ITT should have informed the holders of Hartford
stock that there was a risk that the exchange might be a taxable event because of the fraud
allegedly perpetrated by ITT in getting the favorable ruling from the IRS.”).
172. Id.
173. “ITT also contends that Herbst cannot represent the large, tax-exempt, institutional
shareholders. As noted above, all those who exchanged their shares would have benefited
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In approving the claim as a class action, the court reasoned that,
had the merger been taxable, all shareholders would have been af-
fected, regardless of their tax position.174 Since certain shareholders
would have rejected the merger because of the tax detriment, it
would have compelled the bidder to offer a better price for the
shares, which would have been available to all shareholders.175
While the court seemed to agree that shareholders’ tax conse-
quences vary, it was not the tax effects that created the “class.”
Rather, it was the benefit to all shareholders in the form of a higher
bid.176 The Herbst defendants’ problem was failing to disclose that
the transaction might be taxable, not the specific potential tax con-
sequences for shareholders of a taxable transaction. Such results
are personal to each shareholder.
Similarly, in Swanson v. Wabash, the court found a corporation
liable for shareholders’ personal tax consequences resulting from a
stock purchase transaction.177 The plaintiff alleged that the stock
purchase transaction’s structure denied him the benefits of long-
term capital gains (LTCG) tax treatment because he was forced to
dispose of his stock before he reached the requisite holding pe-
riod.178 Obviously, the holding period of shareholders in their stock
is a completely personal attribute. Nonetheless, the plaintiff proved
that certain shareholders were allowed, under a special arrange-
ment, to hold on to the stock longer than other shareholders,
specifically so they could enjoy LTCG treatment upon disposi-
tion.179 The court found the corporation liable not because of the
plaintiffs’ specific tax loss (in fact, the plaintiff failed to prove he
suffered any tax-related injury)180 but because the opportunity to
hold on to the stock was not made available to all shareholders.181
Had it been, each shareholder would have made his or her own
calculations—considering personal tax positions—as to whether to
hold on to the stock or sell it immediately.
from a higher price. Under Herbst’s claims all shareholders, large and small, tax-exempt or
not, would benefit equally and so her claim is typical.” Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 1322 (“The effect of this misrepresentation was to induce some Hartford Fire
shareholders to exchange their shares on terms less favorable than those which would have
been offered if the tax consequences had been properly represented, the tax-exempt share-
holders may well have been damaged as much as the non-tax-exempt shareholders since the
single exchange offer was made equally to all shareholders without regard to their status quo
taxpayers”).
177. Swanson v. Wabash, Inc., 577 F. Supp. 1308, 1317 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
178. Id. at 1312.
179. Id. at 1317–18.
180. Id. at 1324.
181. Id. at 1323–24.
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A final group of cases dealing with the approval of settlements in
securities fraud class action suits also supports the difficulty of cate-
gorizing reasonable investors into a single class of average
taxpayers. For example, in Ikon Office Solutions, parties to a class ac-
tion and a related derivative suit sought approval of a settlement.182
Several class members objected to the proposed settlement, arguing
that “the Settlement Notice impermissibly failed to inform claim-
ants of the tax consequences of any disbursement.”183 The court
rejected the argument, noting that different claimants may face dif-
ferent tax consequences.184 The court concluded that it was
preferable that claimants consult their own tax advisor rather than
seek disclosure of their tax consequences in the settlement
notice.185
In sum, current case law aligns with the view that an “average
taxpayer” does not exist. Reasonable investors can act on misstated
tax information only where the issuer failed to disclose that tax con-
sequences were associated with the offering. Omitted or misstated
tax information is not actionable where it only fails to describe the
tax consequences for each investor. Courts’ adjudication is, therefore,
in line with financial literature, as well as with the examples with
which this Part began. The “average taxpayer” does not represent
any real-life or theoretical investor whose tax preferences might be
important to market efficiency. When this conclusion becomes
plain, the logic of drafting nonfinancial tax disclosure for the bene-
fit of average taxpayers falls apart. The next Part explores the
theoretical aspects of the failure.
III. MANDATORY DISCLOSURE THEORY AND NONFINANCIAL
TAX INFORMATION
The arguments in Parts I and II were positive ones; they identi-
fied the current state of tax disclosure practices and explained its
functional failures in advancing market efficiency. Part III identifies
the theoretical source of the regulatory failure. The Article thus
takes a normative turn at this point: the question is what kind of
182. In re Ikon Office Solutions, Inc., Sec Litig, 194 F.R.D. 166, 170–72 (E.D. Pa. 2000).
183. Id. at 188.
184. Id.
185. See id. at 188 (“All things considered, singling out one of many potential tax conse-
quences seems more likely to create than alleviate confusion. Generic language stating that it
is advisable to consult a tax specialist is preferable.”); accord In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig.,
109 F. Supp. 2d 235, 255 (D.N.J. 2000) (concluding that personal tax consequences to claim-
ants need not be disclosed because such disclosure related to individual information), aff’d
sub nom., 264 F.3d 201 (3d Cir. 2001).
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nonfinancial tax information registered offerings should disclose
under the guiding principle of U.S. securities regulations-
mandatory disclosure.
A. Mandatory Disclosure and the Intermediary Depiction Model
Whether issuers in registered securities offerings should be sub-
jected to mandatory disclosure requirements is a long-lasting,
voluminous debate in securities regulation literature.186 This Arti-
cle’s purpose is not to add to this discussion. It is clear, however,
that the mandatory disclosure theory largely guides the structure of
the U.S. securities regulatory regime.187 This Article assumes that
mandatory disclosure theory is persuasive and likely to guide the
U.S. securities regulatory framework for the foreseeable future.
According to this theory, mandatory disclosure is necessary to de-
liver the required information to support efficient markets. The
result is the “intermediary depiction model” for securities regula-
tion regime.188 Under this regulatory model, “[a]n intermediary—
for instance, a corporation issuing shares—stands between the in-
vestor and an objective reality.”189 The intermediary, i.e. the issuer,
describes reality to investors, and regulatory efforts ensure that the
depiction is complete and accurate.190 Obviously, the completeness
and accuracy of the information depicted could not possibly “entail
consideration of the entire variety of economic, political, social,
and other aspects of the real world that could affect the fortunes of
186. Sharon Hannes, Comparisons Among Firms: (When) Do They Justify Mandatory Disclo-
sure?, 29 J. CORP. L. 699, 700 (2004) (“The justifications for the mandatory nature of federal
securities disclosure regulation have been thoroughly examined in the literature, during a
long lasting debate . . . .”); Lawrence A. Cunningham, Capital Market Theory, Mandatory Disclo-
sure, and Price Discovery, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 843, 845 (1994) (“the proper scope of the
mandatory disclosure rules has been debated almost continually since the enactment of the
1934 Act”).
187. See Roger J. Dennis, Mandatory Disclosure Theory and Management Projections: A Law and
Economics Perspective, 46 MD. L. REV. 1197, 1205–06 (1987) (highlighting the debate over
mandatory disclosure and the rationale of mandatory disclosure as the “bulwark” of the re-
gime against “securities fraud”); see also Edward Rock, Securities Regulation as Lobster Trap: A
Credible Commitment Theory of Mandatory Disclosure, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 675, 678–82 (2002)
(describing structural entry into the SEC system through the mandatory disclosure require-
ments of the federal securities regime).
188. Hu, supra note 21, at 1614–28 (2012) (describing the history of securities regulation
and the rise of the intermediary depiction model).
189. Id. at 1608.
190. Id. at 1623.
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a company’s investors: the mandate has long centered on firm-spe-
cific matters.”191
To examine whether mandatory disclosure theory and its pri-
mary instrument—the intermediary depiction model—actually
advance market efficiency in the tax context, deconstruction of the
concept of market efficiency into its main components is necessary.
Generally, market efficiency is understood to have two main deter-
minants: accurate pricing mechanisms and financial liquidity.192
This Subpart discusses nonfinancial tax disclosures within each
context.
1. Mandatory Disclosure and Accurate Pricing in the Tax Context
While disclosure could theoretically be voluntary,193 mandatory
disclosure is economically justified because it is the least costly way
to disseminate the optimal level of information to the market.194
First, mandatory disclosure reduces the cost of generating informa-
tion because it is cheaper for the issuer to disclose information it
holds anyway, rather than for the outside investor to unearth such
information.195 In the context of tax consequences to investors,
however, the issuer does not have all the relevant tax informa-
tion.196 Much of this pertains to investors’ tax attributes, which the
issuer is unlikely to be able to discover. From a practical point of
view, it would be extremely costly for issuers to approach all of their
investors in order to obtain all the relevant tax information. This is
especially true considering the frequent trading that occurs in the
public market. From a legal standpoint, privacy safeguards protect
most taxpayer information, which makes it impossible to acquire
191. Id.; see also Allen Ferrel, Mandatory Disclosure and Stock Returns: Evidence from the Over-
the-Counter Market, 36 J. LEG. STUD. 213, 213–14 (2007).
192. Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 5, at 714.
193. See Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation,
107 YALE L.J. 2359, 2374–76 (1998) (discussing voluntary disclosure by firms when issuing
stock and overall disclosure of “significant amounts of information beyond that mandated by
securities regulators”); Alan R. Palmiter, Toward Disclosure Choice in Securities Offerings, 1999
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 5–7 (1999) (investors’ disclosure demands would “govern the supply
of information,” i.e., “issuers in public offerings often disclose information . . . to increase
investor confidence”); Mark Lang & Russell Lundholm, Cross-Sectional Determinants of Analyst
Ratings of Corporate Disclosures, 31 J. ACCT. RSRCH. 246, 269 (1993) (demonstrating that firms
with higher disclosure scores had better returns, better earnings, and issued securities); but
see Robert Prentice, Whither Securities Regulation? Some Behavioral Observations Regarding Propos-
als for its Future, 51 DUKE L.J. 1397, 1416–23 (2002) (highlighting the inadequacy of voluntary
corporate disclosure before the passage of the Securities Acts).
194. See Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 5, at 738.
195. Id.
196. See supra Part I.B.
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such information without a waiver from investors.197 Returning to
the FC and DC example, Divicorp could not reasonably be ex-
pected to know that DC can utilize a foreign tax credit to offset
income it has from sources unrelated to DC’s investment in
Divicorp’s stock.
Second, absent mandatory disclosures, it is unlikely that outside
investors without inside access can discover all the relevant informa-
tion, even if the outsiders are willing to pay high costs.198 In the tax
context, such an argument may or may not be relevant. Much of
the important tax information is already found with the investors.
For example, DC already knows it can use foreign tax credits to its
benefit. In fact, DC is the only one in a position to know whether
foreign tax credits are available for it to use.
Third, unless disclosure is standardized and mandatory, investors
might engage in duplicative efforts to unearth the same undis-
closed information. In essence, the standardized, mandatory
disclosures make it easier and cheaper for investors to compare in-
vestment alternatives.199 In the context of nonfinancial tax
information, this justification is weak. Each investor is uniquely situ-
ated for tax purposes and does not need the same information. For
example, DC may wish to uncover whether Divicorp’s dividend dis-
tribution carries a foreign tax credit. FC, on the other hand, does
not care, since it cannot use the foreign tax credit.
Fourth, mandatory disclosure serves as a collective subsidy for all
investors who trade based on information.200 This is unlikely for
nonfinancial tax disclosures related to investor-level attributes be-
cause they are costly for the issuer to obtain but costless to
investors, who already hold the information. The subsidy argument
could theoretically apply to information that relates to issuer-level
nonfinancial tax attributes (such as whether the issuer paid foreign
taxes for which a foreign tax credit may be granted).
197. Multiple Code provisions protect taxpayers’ information. The main underpinning of
tax privacy is found in section 6103 of the IRC that protects the confidentiality of “tax re-
turns” as well as “return information,” two broadly constructed concepts. For a full
description of the legal framework of tax privacy in the United States, see generally Joshua D.
Blank, United States National Report on Tax Privacy, in Tax Secrecy and Tax Transparency—The
Relevance of Confidentiality in Tax Law 1163 (Eleonor Kristoffersson et. al., eds. 2013).
198. Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 5, at 738; see also Hannes, supra note 186, at 705
(noting that “[a]nother common argument for disclosure regulation is that management has
incentives to suppress unfavorable information-to withhold adverse information and to un-
dertake preemptive buyouts of its own firm. As a result, investors will not have sufficient data
concerning the market and will be unable to distinguish quality differences among traded
firms).
199. See Hannes, supra note 186, at 706–07.
200. See Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 5, at 740.
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2. Mandatory Disclosure and Liquidity in the Tax Context
Mandatory disclosure supports liquidity in the market by ensur-
ing symmetrical access to information.201 In the absence of
mandatory disclosure, less-informed investors might lose confi-
dence in the market because they are always at a disadvantage.202
Asymmetrical information might make less-informed investors re-
luctant to trade or more likely to suggest lower bidding prices or
higher asking prices for their securities. Mandatory disclosure thus
allows less-informed investors a “free ride” on the market prices set
by informed investors.203
However, a “reasonable investor” cannot rationally rely on the
market interpretation of nonfinancial tax information related to in-
vestor-level tax consequences. The market’s pricing of assets reflects
the tax preferences of specific classes of investors, not all inves-
tors.204 If an investor wishes to invest in a specific security, she
cannot reasonably assume that her tax preferences are reflected in
market prices. Thus, a reasonable investor must consider her own
tax status and must not free-ride market interpretation of tax conse-
quences. She must spend time and resources in order evaluate how
taxes may affect her own particular situation. The best way to do so
is probably to consult her tax advisor.205
B. The Partial Failure of the Intermediary Depiction Model in the
Context of Nonfinancial Tax Disclosure
The discussion of nonfinancial tax disclosure above suggests that
the intermediary depiction model is not always best suited to dis-
seminate nonfinancial tax information. The intermediary depiction
model requires that an issuer disclose information about itself. In
the context of nonfinancial tax disclosures, much of the “material”
information relates to the investor, in which case the issuer is not an
“intermediary” standing between objective reality and the investor.
201. Christian Leuz & Peter Wysocki, Capital-Market Effects of Corporate Disclosures and Dis-
closure Regulation, 2 Task Force to Modernize Securities Legislation in Canada: Research
Studies 183, 196 (Jun. 26, 2006), available at http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/christian.leuz/
research/papers/Capital-Market-Effects-of-Corporate-Disclosures-and-Disclosure-Regulation
.pdf (mandatory disclosure as a “commitment” tool for companies to reveal the same amount
of information and mitigate informational asymmetries); Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra
note 5, at 740.
202. See Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 5, at 740.
203. Id.
204. See discussion supra notes 117–138 and accompanying text.
205. See supra notes 88–92 and accompanying text.
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At best, an issuing entity is in a position to assess the relevant tax
provisions that may apply to a particular offering but cannot possi-
bly assess the applicability of such provisions to any particular
investor. Nonfinancial tax disclosures could potentially describe the
relevant legal authorities in the abstract, but such disclosure would
simply be a restatement of the tax laws. Securities law generally does
not require disclosure of public knowledge.206
Conversely, in the case of financial tax disclosures, the issuer is
an intermediary standing between relevant tax information and the
investor. Whether a corporation paid foreign taxes, which would
trigger foreign tax credits for domestic investors, is information for
which the corporation is an intermediary. The financial tax disclo-
sure required under the current regulatory regime would include
that information.
It is also possible, however, to identify instances in which the is-
suer is an intermediary for nonfinancial tax disclosures as well. For
example, certain foreign corporations owned by “U.S. sharehold-
ers” are classified under the IRC as “controlled foreign
corporations” (CFC).207 If a CFC earns income that is classified as
“subpart F income,”208 such income is deemed distributed to the
CFC’s “U.S. shareholders.”209 This means that U.S. shareholders are
taxed on the dividend deemed distributed to them from the CFC,
notwithstanding the fact that no actual distribution occurred.
Whether income is “subpart F income” is a matter of law and de-
pends largely on the nature of the activities of the corporation
earning the income. Therefore, issuers that are CFCs probably do
stand between the relevant fact—whether they earned “subpart F
income”—and the investor, who would want to know whether he or
she is taxed on his or her own account as a result of the corpora-
tion’s activities.210
To summarize, the intermediary depiction model is not always
suited for nonfinancial tax disclosures. It is not helpful when the
206. See In re Progress Energy, Inc., 371 F. Supp. 2d 548, 552–53 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (“It is
well-established law that the securities laws do not require disclosure of information that is
publicly known . . . .”).
207. A CFC is a foreign corporation if more than fifty percent of its voting stock is held by
“U.S. shareholders.” I.R.C. § 957.
208. Subpart F income is generally income from passive sources. See I.R.C. § 954.
209. A “U.S. shareholder” is a United States resident holding ten percent or more of the
total combined voting power of the corporation. I.R.C. § 957.
210. Practice in this regard is mixed. However, some issuers disclose the fact that they
may qualify as CFCs. See, e.g., Arizona Chemical Ltd., SEC Registration Statement (Form S-1),
at 163 (Apr. 12, 2010) (discussing the application of CFC rules to the offering), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1489057/000095012310034000/y82079sv1.htm.
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tax information at issue relates to investors’ individual tax attrib-
utes. It might be relevant, however, for information relating to
issuers’ tax attributes, which investors need to know in order to cal-
culate their own tax liabilities. Building on this conclusion, the final
Part proposes a reform to the regulatory framework controlling
nonfinancial tax disclosures. The reform disposes of the “average
taxpayer” construct and argues for the disclosure of nonfinancial
tax items justified by mandatory disclosure theory, meaning tax in-
formation for which the intermediary depiction model makes
sense.
IV. REFORMING NONFINANCIAL TAX DISCLOSURE REGULATION
As explained above, mandatory disclosure theory may support
market efficiency to the extent that the disclosure (i) describes rele-
vant information about issuers and (ii) is similarly applicable to all
investors (i.e., information is not related to investors’ own individ-
ual tax position). Under current practices, however, disclosed
nonfinancial tax information (i) is not always about the issuer (but
sometimes about the investors) and (ii) does not apply generically
to all investors (but only to “average” taxpayers). For these reasons,
the regulatory regime fails.
Mandatory disclosure theory remains the guiding principle of se-
curities regulation and underlies this Article’s proposed reform.
This reform aims to ensure that issuers disclose all (and only!) non-
financial tax information that mandatory disclosure theory justifies
disclosing. Using this approach, the market-created average tax-
payer construct is irrelevant and nonfinancial tax disclosures are
broadly applicable.
Current nonfinancial tax disclosure practice and regulation cate-
gorize all nonfinancial tax information as a single category of
disclosure pertaining to tax consequences at the investor level.211
This Part proposes drawing a clear line between two types of nonfi-
nancial tax information: nonfinancial investor-level tax information
and nonfinancial dual-level tax information. As explained below,
the mandatory disclosure theory supports disclosure of only the
latter.
211. See discussion supra Part I.A.
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A. Nonfinancial Investor-Level Tax Disclosures Should be Eliminated
Investor-level tax information is any information that (i) the inves-
tor rather than the issuer has and (ii) pertains to tax consequences
where the value of a security depends on each investor’s individual
tax attributes. Mandatory disclosure theory cannot justify the disclo-
sure of nonfinancial investor-level tax information.
Unfortunately, the current regulatory regime seems to require
the disclosure of such information. Item 601(b)(8) of Regulation S-
K mandates a disclosure, qualified by an opinion, “supporting the
tax matters and consequences . . . as described in the filing when
such tax matters are material.”212 Such “material” consequences
may include (or depend on) investor-level tax items.213
As discussed in Part I, nonfinancial tax disclosures that meet the
literal breadth of Item 601(b)(8) are impossible to draft as a practi-
cal matter. Moreover, the literal requirements are not practiced or
enforced. Courts consistently do not impose liability on registrants
who failed to accurately state investor-level tax outcomes. In addi-
tion, it seems that practitioners implicitly adopt the view that issuers
should not disclose some investor-level tax items. For example, the
Tax Bar takes the position that the “tax consequences of owning
and selling common stock . . . are not ‘material to an investor’”214
because the tax consequences associated with such transactions are
regarded as “plain vanilla” consequences.215 By doing so, the New
York State Bar Association implicitly suggests that such issuers do
not need to disclose such information under the current regulatory
framework, though such information is sometimes disclosed
voluntarily.216
Information about the tax consequences of holding and selling
common stock is a perfect example of an investor-level tax disclo-
sure that mandatory disclosure theory does not support. The effects
of taxable gain or capital loss associated with stock disposition
strictly relate to each investor’s particular position and, in most
cases, do not relate to actions the issuing entity has taken.217
Although issuers should not disclose the tax consequences of
owning and selling common stock, the reason is not that these con-
sequences are immaterial. The cost of capital gains taxes associated
with the disposition of the stock, which can be as high as twenty
212. SEC Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.601(b)(8).
213. See discussion supra Part I.A.
214. See N.Y. BAR REPORT, supra note 14, at 5.
215. Id.
216. See supra Part I.
217. See discussion supra notes 49–50 and accompanying text.
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percent on the net gain,218 is very material to “reasonable investors.”
In fact, the tax costs associated with stock disposition have been
empirically proven to affect investment decisions.219
The diversity of practice in determining “materiality” in the con-
text of common stock disposition confirms the confusion with
respect to the materiality standard. For example, three recent ma-
jor initial offerings of common stock completely diverged in their
scope of the nonfinancial tax disclosure and qualifying opinion.
Groupon, Inc.’s pre-IPO registration statement included a rather
expansive disclosure addressing the tax consequences associated
with holding and disposing of the offered stock.220 Facebook, Inc.’s
IPO disclosure, however, contained a significantly narrower disclo-
sure, which only addressed the tax consequences to non-U.S.
shareholders.221 Finally, Google, Inc.’s registration statement did
not include any nonfinancial tax disclosure addressing tax conse-
quences associated with the ownership and disposition of its
common stock.222
This Article argues that the tax consequences associated with
stock dispositions are material. The real justification not to disclose
such consequences is that the material information pertaining to
tax consequences of stock dispositions is information about the in-
vestor, not the issuer. Under the same logic, it is justifiable not to
disclose, for example, state tax consequences. The SEC currently
approves nondisclosure of state tax consequences,223 though it
seems clear that nothing in Item 601(b)(8) exempts such informa-
tion from disclosure.224 It should not be disclosed simply because
the issuer does not have such information. Only investors are in a
position to appreciate which states’ taxes may be relevant to their
investment decisions.
218. See discussion of the capital gains tax rates supra note 49.
219. See Zhonglan Dai et al., supra note 122, at 710, 738 (finding a “lock-in effect” and
investors holding onto capital gains due to decreased supply after a reduction in the capital
gains rate); see also Peter Klein, The Capital Gain Lock-In Effect and Long-Horizon Return Reversal,
59 J. FIN. ECON. 33, 57 (2001) (testing an asset pricing model where long-horizon investors
will realize gains they have “locked-in” due to accrued capital gains in high tax periods dur-
ing low periods at the end of a long horizon).
220. See Groupon Registration Statement, supra note 61, at 139.
221. See Facebook, Inc., SEC Registration Statement: Material U.S. Federal Tax Considera-
tions for Non-U.S. Holders of Class A Common Stock (Form S-1), at 140 (Feb. 1, 2012), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1326801/000119312512034517/d287954ds1
.htm#toc287954_18.
222. See Google, Inc., SEC Registration Statement Class A Stock (Form S-1), (Apr. 29,
2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1288776/0001193125040736
39/ds1.htm#toc.
223. See discussion supra notes 84–86 and accompanying text.
224. Id.
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The SEC should amend Item 601(b)(8) (and any other nonfi-
nancial tax disclosure provisions) to explicitly state that issuers are
not required to disclose information relating solely to investor-level
tax items.
B. Nonfinancial Dual-Level Tax Disclosures Should be Expanded
1. Dual-Level Nonfinancial Tax Disclosure Explained
Dual-level tax disclosure refers to issuer-level tax information that
directly affects how investors calculate their tax liabilities and the
resulting tax cost associated with the investment.225 One example of
dual-level information is whether an issuer is a CFC and, if so,
whether it earned “subpart F income.”226 In order to calculate their
tax liability, certain investors must know both pieces of information.
If we accept mandatory disclosure theory, then the disclosure of
subpart F income is justified because the issuer is best positioned to
know that information. Investors, however, should figure out for
themselves the effect of subpart F income to their stock value and
tax liability.
It is not clear to what extent Item 601(b)(8) currently requires
issuers to disclose dual-level tax consequences. The SEC has said,
for example, that tax information related to “mergers or exchange
transactions where the registrant represents that the transaction is
tax-free (e.g., spin-offs, stock-for-stock mergers)” is “material” and
thus required to be disclosed and qualified by an opinion.227 This is
logical because whether a merger qualifies for tax-free treatment is
a question the issuer is best positioned to answer.
In some cases, however, the SEC does not require disclosure of
dual-level nonfinancial tax items. For example, the SEC stated that
“when a registrant represents that an exchange offer or merger is a
225. Tax law, not securities regulations, occasionally requires such “dual-level” disclosure.
The rationale driving such disclosures is to ensure consistency of the tax treatment between
the issuer and the holder. For example, issuers of instruments with original issue discount
(OID) must report the OID income tax accruals to holders of the debt instrument on IRS
form 1099-OID; issuers of contingent payment debt instruments (CPDIs) are required to
disclose to holders the projected payment schedule on the CPDI. Treas. Reg. § 1.1275-
4(b)(4)(iv); Treas. Reg. § 1.1275-2(e). In this Article, the main focus is the securities regula-
tion rationale although it may occasionally overlap with the tax rationale. See discussion infra
notes 210–212 and accompanying text.
226. See discussion infra notes 207–209 and accompanying text.
227. SEC Legal Bulletin, supra note 7, at 12.
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taxable transaction,” the representation is not “material.”228 It fol-
lows that, under the plain language of the regulations, the issuer
need not disclose the item. This approach is inconsistent with
mandatory disclosure theory.229 The fact that a transaction may be
taxable is a material fact for reasonable investors across the board,
regardless of the fact that the tax consequences for each investor
may be different.
The SEC should rewrite Item 601(b)(8) to require disclosure of
any nonfinancial tax item that (i) is an issuing entity-level tax item
not already disclosed in the financial statements230 and (ii) may af-
fect how investors calculate their own tax liabilities, despite the fact
that each investor’s actual tax liability may be different.
If the SEC adopts this rule, then nonfinancial tax disclosures can
be applicable to all investors, regardless of their “averageness,” and
the drafters can dispose of the concept of the “average taxpayer.”
There will be no need to exclude any investor from the scope of tax
disclosure, regardless of whether an investor is subject to a unique
tax regime or purchased the security in the initial offering or the
secondary market. All investors, average and non-average, will find
in dual-level disclosures the information that—together with their
personal tax information—allows them to calculate the tax cost as-
sociated with the investment.
2. Some Examples for Dual-Level Nonfinancial Tax Disclosure
This Subsection provides examples of the types of tax informa-
tion mandatory disclosure theory justifies. While the examples may
appear random to the untrained eye, all relate to tax information
found with the issuer that investors must know to calculate their
own tax liabilities. Market practice is to disclose some, but not all, of
the examples discussed below. The proposed regulatory regime
calls for clearly defining dual-level tax disclosures, which should
make practice consistent.
a. Whether an Issuer is a Corporation or Partnership for Tax Purposes
Under the U.S. “classical system” of corporate taxation, corpo-
rate entities are opaque for tax purposes. Taxes are imposed at the
228. Id.
229. See discussion supra Part IV.
230. This is to prevent duplicative disclosure of information that is required under Regu-
lation S-X.
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corporate level (and then again on the investors upon distribution
of dividends or the disposition of stock). Shareholders do not bear
corporate taxes directly.231 Therefore, corporate tax expenses are
part of financial statements, not nonfinancial disclosure.
Partnerships, on the other hand, are generally transparent for
tax purposes. Any income the partnership earned is not taxed at
the partnership level but rather “flows through” to the investor (as
do most other partnership tax attributes).232 Thus, investors must
know whether the issuing entity is a corporation or is a partnership
for tax purposes. For a partnership, investors should expect to re-
port partnership earnings on their own tax returns, regardless of
whether the partnership distributes anything to the investors.233
Such disclosure is part of current practice.
b. Whether an Issuer Qualifies for a Special Tax Status
Under the IRC, if the issuing entity meets certain requirements
shareholders may become subject to a unique taxation regime. For
example, capital gains are normally non-taxable in the U.S. to non-
U.S. residents.234 However, if a domestic corporation’s value com-
prises mostly of real estate located in the United States, the entity
becomes a United States Real Property Holding Corporation
(USRPHC).235 Upon the disposition of stock in a USRPHC, certain
foreign shareholders,236 like U.S. residents, must pay taxes on any
gain from the disposition.237 Since an issuing entity is best posi-
tioned to know whether it owns enough U.S. real estate to qualify as
a USRPHC, regulations should require issuers to disclose whether
they are USRPHCs or not. Disclosure practice in this area is
mixed.238
231. In fact, the question of who bears the burden of corporate taxes is a highly conten-
tious issue in academic literature.
232. See I.R.C. § 701.
233. Under section 7701 of the Code, a publicly traded partnership must meet certain
requirements in order not to be treated as a corporation for tax purposes. Whether the
issuing entity qualifies for partnership treatment would be material for any reasonable
investor.
234. See I.R.C. §§ 865, 871.
235. See I.R.C. § 897(c).
236. Disposition of publicly traded stock is exempted from the scope of the rule to the
extent the owner owns less than five percent of such class of publicly traded stock. I.R.C.
§ 897(c)(3).
237. See I.R.C. § 897(c).
238. In the author’s experience, some issuers may offer disclosure in that respect, sug-
gesting that they may or may not be USRPHCs for tax purposes. Other issuers simply ignore
this issue.
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Another example is the Passive Foreign Investment Company
(PFIC). A PFIC is a foreign corporation that meets certain thresh-
olds of passive earnings or passive assets holdings.239 If a
corporation is a PFIC, shareholders may elect to mark-to-market
their holdings each year and report their taxes as if they have sold
their PFIC stock.240 Shareholders may also elect to include the
PFIC’s deemed earnings in their own income on an ongoing basis
regardless of whether distributions were made, provided investors
have enough information about corporate earnings.241 Finally,
shareholders may do nothing and then pay heavy interest on back
taxes when an actual distribution occurs or the PFIC stock is dis-
posed of.242 An issuing entity is best positioned to know if it is a
PFIC because it can assess the value of its passive-income-generating
assets or the amount of its passive income. PFIC disclosure practice
is mixed, and issuers often resort to noncommittal language, such
as: “to the best of the issuer’s knowledge” it is or is not a PFIC.243
The suggested regulatory regime would require issuers to clearly
state whether they are PFICs and whether they will provide informa-
tion to allow investors to report deemed-distributed income on an
ongoing basis. Multiple other examples exist for entity classification
that affects investor-level tax liabilities. Such examples include, but
are not limited to, CFCs as discussed above, Real Estate Investment
Trusts (REITs), and Regulated Investment Companies (RICs).
c. Whether a Distribution Qualifies as a “Dividend” for Tax Purposes
Whether a distribution qualifies as a dividend for tax purposes
affects the investor’s tax treatment. A “dividend” distribution
239. I.R.C. § 1297 (providing the basic threshold requirements for classification as a PFIC
of seventy-five percent or more of the gross income is passive income and the average per-
centage of assets that produce passive income is at least fifty percent).
240. Id. § 1296.
241. Id. § 1293.
242. Id. § 1291.
243. See Harmony Gold Mining Company, Ltd., SEC Registration Statement: Additional
Information (Form F-20), at 140 (Oct. 25, 2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/
edgar/data/1023514/000119312513411617/d612311d20f.htm (“We believe that we will not
be a passive foreign investment company, or PFIC, for US federal income tax purposes for
the current taxable year. However, we cannot assure you that we will not be considered a
PFIC in the current or future years.”); see also LiveReel Media Corp., SEC Registration State-
ment: Additional Information (Form F-20), at 42 (Oct. 28, 2013), available at http://www.sec
.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1168981/000107997413000671/lievreel20f63013.htm (“We do
not believe that LiveReel has previously been, or currently are a PFIC. However, there can be
no assurance that the IRS will not challenge our determination concerning our PFIC status
or that we will not be a PFIC for the current or any future taxable year.”).
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subjects investors to a tax on dividend income.244 A non-dividend
distribution is treated as a return of capital, not taxable to the ex-
tent of the investor’s basis in the security, and thereafter subject to
capital gains taxes.245 Whether a distribution qualifies as a “divi-
dend” for tax purposes is clearly a dual-level disclosure item
because only distributions made out of earnings and profits (E&P)
are “dividends” for tax purposes.246
Significantly, whether a corporation has enough E&P to support
a dividend is a determination made at the end of the tax year. Dis-
tributions to shareholders, however, are made throughout the year,
before an E&P determination can be made. In certain circum-
stances, tax law requires a corporation making a distribution before
year-end to make a “reasonable estimate” in order to determine
whether a mid-year distribution constitutes a dividend.247 This esti-
mate is based on the “anticipated amount” of E&P,248 which, in
turn, depends on the corporation’s forward-looking expectations of
its business performance between the time of distribution and the
end of the year. Thus, only the distributing entity can determine
whether there will be enough E&P to support a dividend treatment,
not the investors. Investors, however, must know if a distribution is
a “dividend” in order to calculate their tax liability, so disclosure of
this information should be mandatory.
d. The Expected Tax Treatment of a Structured Financial Instrument
Different types of securities are subject to different tax treat-
ments. Debt is treated differently than equity and equity derivatives.
Different types of debt tax classifications may carry different tax re-
sults. It is no wonder that issuers discuss at length in their disclosure
documents whether offered debt instruments should be treated as
Variable Rate Debt Instruments (VRDIs) or Contingent Payment
Debt Instruments (CPDIs). In the context of equity derivatives, it is
notoriously difficult to differentiate between “Reverse Convertible,”
“Variable Prepaid Forward Contract,” “Contingent Convertible,” or
one of a multitude of other variations, all subject to different tax
treatments.
244. I.R.C. § 316, 301(c)(1).
245. See id. §§ 301(a), 301(c)(2), (c)(3).
246. See id. §§ 312, 316.
247. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1441-3(c).
248. See id.
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While the classification of a debt instrument is not a per se issuer-
level item, two main justifications support disclosing the classifica-
tion. First, an instrument’s classification often depends on the likely
occurrence of a future event, the materialization of a specific risk,
or other events unrelated to the investors.249 The issuer who tai-
lored the specific instrument is much better prepared to analyze
the likelihood that such events may occur than any prospective in-
vestor and, consequently, to opine on the instrument’s most likely
tax classification.
Second, while issuers and investors are not required to agree on
an instrument’s tax classification,250 inconsistent treatment creates
problems for investors. For example, if an issuer classifies an instru-
ment as debt for tax purposes, payments on the instrument are
likely to be regarded as interest, creating a deductible expense to
the issuer. The IRS expects the investor to report a corresponding
inclusion of interest income. If the investor believes, however, that
the instrument is an equity derivative, he or she may regard any
payments as a nontaxable return of capital. The IRS is sure to dis-
like the discrepancy and may try to recharacterize the payments. An
investor who argues for a specific classification of an instrument
may find itself at odds with the IRS, if the issuer takes a different
position.251 Requiring issuers to disclose their intended classifica-
tion of securities is therefore justified. Such disclosure is part of
current practice.
249. See Omri Marian & Andrew Moin, Taxation of Structured Debt in a Low Rate Environ-
ment 135 TAX NOTES 323, 324–25 (2012) (explaining how fluctuation of indices and market
borrowing rates may affect the tax treatment of debt instruments).
250. As noted above, tax law occasionally requires issuers of financial instruments to dis-
close certain tax items in respect of the instruments to investors, in order to assure issuer and
holder’s consistent treatment. See discussion supra note 225.
251. C.I.R. v. Danielson, 378 F.2d 771, 777–78 (3d Cir. 1967) (holding that absent proof
that negates the agreement (i.e. fraud, duress, etc.), taxpayers may not report income in a
manner inconsistent with the agreement). Consequently issuers regularly insert language in
nonfinancial disclosure sections binding investor to report the security in a particular way for
federal income tax purposes. See, e.g., Barclays PLC, SEC Preliminary Pricing Prospectus Sup-
plement Phoenix Autocallable Notes (Form 424B1) at pps-6 (Jul. 19, 2013), available at http:/
/www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/312070/000110465914001599/a14-1048_15424b2.htm
(“Pursuant to the terms of the Notes, Barclays Bank PLC and you agree, in the absence of a
change in law or an administrative or judicial ruling to the contrary, to characterize your
Notes as a contingent income-bearing derivative contract with respect to the Reference
Asset.”).
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3. The Possibility of “Check-Listing” Dual-Level
Nonfinancial Tax Disclosures
It is possible to reform the regulatory requirements using a ge-
neric definition of the items needing disclosure. As explained
above, a generic approach will require the disclosure of any issuer-
level nonfinancial tax information that may affect how investors cal-
culate their own tax liabilities (namely, “dual-level tax items”). It is
not inconceivable, however, to generate a checklist covering all tax
items meeting such qualifications. A taskforce could be formed to
survey the tax code and create a list of all dual-level items in order
to standardize nonfinancial tax disclosures and create a “check-the-
box” SEC form. Various disclosure events probably need specific
checklists. For example, a different checklist would apply to a proxy
solicitation in the context of a merger than would apply to IPOs or
periodic disclosures.
The following example illustrates how a checklist might work. In
its annual report to shareholders, an issuer must answer “yes” or
“no” to whether it is a CFC at the time of the report. If “yes,” then
the issuer will have to report the amount of Subpart F income for
the period:
Item [x]: Is the registrant a controlled foreign corporation






Item [x](i): If the registrant is a CFC, enter the amount of Sub-
part F income as defined in Section 952 of the Internal
Revenue Code, for the reported period: $_______
While the task of generating such checklists may seem daunting,
the end result would be clear and concise nonfinancial tax disclo-
sures, useful to all investors. Regulators, academics, and the tax bar
should consider mounting such an effort.
4. Dual-Level Nonfinancial Tax Disclosure is Beneficial
Compared to the Current Regime
Finally, the proposed regime is likely to be far more effective and
efficient than the current state of affairs. This benefit is important
because SEC rulemaking requires an extensive cost-benefit analysis
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before adopting a regulatory change.252 It is beyond this Article’s
scope to analyze the costs and benefits of the proposed dual-level
tax disclosure regime, although the analysis likely will support the
proposal’s adoption.
Generally speaking, the SEC analyzes four factors during the
rulemaking process. First, it must identify “the need for the
rulemaking and [explain] how the proposed rule will meet that
need.”253 This Article identified the need to revise current nonfi-
nancial tax disclosures. It explained how current disclosures fail to
achieve the perceived purposes of the U.S. securities regulation re-
gime.254 The Article also explained how dual-level tax disclosure
would support the regulatory rationale.255
Second, a cost-benefit analysis requires the SEC to articulate the
“economic baseline against which to measure the proposed rule’s
likely economic impact (in terms of potential benefits and costs,
including effects on efficiency, competition, and capital formation
in the market(s) the rule would affect).”256 The proposal assumes
that the baseline is the current regime, which does not effectively
promote market efficiency.257
The third requirement is to clearly identify and evaluate “reason-
able alternatives to the proposed regulatory approach.”258 This
Article identified two alternatives: a generic rule requiring dual-
level nonfinancial tax disclosures and more detailed “check-listing”
of dual-level tax disclosures. The development of the checklist alter-
native is beyond this Article’s scope.
Lastly, the heart of the rulemaking process is comparing the costs
and benefits of the proposed alternatives against the baseline.259
Part I outlined the costs of the current regime.260 Both the generic
alternative and the “checklist” alternative of dual-level tax disclo-
sures will probably fare better than the current regime when
comparing costs and benefits.
In terms of the benefits, dual-level tax disclosures should en-
hance disclosure of tax information that is relevant for efficient
252. See generally SEC Staff of the Rulewriting Divisions and Offices, Memorandum on
Current Guidance on Economic Analysis in SEC Rulemaking (Mar. 16, 2012), available at
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/riskfin/rsfi_guidance_econ_analy_secrulemaking.pdf [herein-
after Rulewriting Memorandum].
253. Id. at 1.
254. See discussion supra Part I.
255. See discussion supra Part IV.B.
256. Rulewriting Memorandum, supra note 252, at 1.
257. See discussion infra Part I.D.
258. See Rulewriting Memorandum, supra note 252, at 1.
259. Id. at 1–3.
260. See discussion supra Part I.D.
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markets and eliminate the disclosure of irrelevant information. All
investors should find dual-level nonfinancial tax information rele-
vant (as opposed to very few investors under current regime).
In terms of costs, dual-level tax disclosures should reduce costs
for investors, issuers, and the SEC. Investors will have access to pre-
viously undisclosed information, and therefore information-
gathering costs are expected to decrease. Issuers will not be re-
quired to generate any new information because they already hold
all the dual-level tax information. On the other hand, the regula-
tion would not require issuers to disclose information they do not
have (namely, investor-level tax information). Under the checklist
method, disclosure will be particularly cost-effective to issuers, as a
“check-the-box” type form will replace the current lengthy tax nar-
ratives. The SEC should also find that its costs in enforcing
nonfinancial tax disclosure rules shrink as the framework of re-
quired dual-level tax disclosures becomes clearer. The only
significant new cost would be a onetime outlay to generate the pro-
posed checklist, a cost that a better disclosure regime should
outweigh.
CONCLUSION: CONSULT YOUR OWN TAX ADVISOR
Nonfinancial tax disclosure regulation aims to ensure that “rea-
sonable investors” receive all the “material” information related to
the investors’ tax consequences from a registered securities invest-
ment. This regulatory regime reflects the widespread acceptance of
the efficient capital markets hypothesis and the mandatory disclo-
sure framework it supports.
This Article argued that even if we accept the current regulatory
rationale without reservation, the regulatory framework does not
support the rationale. Specifically, investors in publicly-traded se-
curities have varying tax preferences, even if all are “reasonable
investors.” Thus, drafting nonfinancial tax disclosures to address all
the tax effects that a reasonable investor may deem material be-
comes impractical.
The market, in response to this practical difficulty, drafts nonfi-
nancial tax disclosures for the benefit of a “reasonable investor”
who is also an “average taxpayer.” This Article showed that the con-
cept of the average taxpayer is indefensible. No “average” taxpayer
exists because tax laws, by definition, create rules of particular ap-
plicability to each taxpayer. Moreover, financial literature reveals
that the tax preferences that actually make a difference in capital
market operations are the preferences of taxpayers who are not
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classified as “average.” The result is that current nonfinancial tax
disclosures describe tax consequences that are largely irrelevant to
the regulatory rationale.
The Article also showed that the regulatory framework fails to
account for the special nature of tax information required to deter-
mine investors’ tax consequences. Mandatory disclosure theory calls
for the disclosure, by issuers, of information about themselves.
However, much of the information that determines a securities in-
vestment’s tax outcome is about the investors, which the investors
alone already know. This Article, therefore, advocates reforming
the regulatory framework to require disclosure only of nonfinancial
tax information about the issuers that investors may need to calcu-
late their own tax liabilities. The disclosure could be formatted as a
checklist.
In all likelihood, even assuming market participants’ best inten-
tions, issuers cannot be expected to disclose all material
nonfinancial tax information to investors with heterogeneous tax
preferences. To the extent relevant information relates to investor-
level tax consequences, seeking personal tax advice is the only pru-
dent course of action. This Article ends, therefore, with generic
advice to all investors in publicly-traded securities: consult your own
tax advisor. It is the best piece of advice issuers regularly include in
tax disclosures. Follow it.
